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Josep Mestres Dom` enechAbstract
My thesis dissertation focuses on the temporariness of migration, its diverse effects as
well as on migration selection.
The ﬁrst paper, A Dynamic Model of Return Migration analyzes the decision pro-
cess underlying return migration using a dynamic model. We explain how migrants
decide whether to stay or to go back to their home country together with their savings
and consumption decisions. We simulate our model with return intentions and perform
policy simulations.
The second paper, Remittances and Temporary Migration, studies the remittance
behaviour of immigrants and how it relates to temporary versus permanent migration
plans. We use a unique data source that provides unusual detail on the purpose of
remittances, savings, and return plans, and follows the same household over time. Our
results suggest that changes in return plans lead to large changes in remittance ﬂows.
The third paper, Savings, Asset Holdings, and Temporary, analyzes how return
plans affect not only remittances but also savings and the accumulation of assets. We
show that immigrants with temporary return plans place a higher proportion of savings
in the home country and have accumulated a higher amount and share of assets and
housing value in the home country (compared to the host country).
Finally, the fourth paper, Migrant Selection to the U.S.: Evidence from the Mex-
ican Family Life Survey (MxFLS), studies the selection in terms of skills of recent
migrants to the United States using the MxFLS. We highlight the important age gra-
dient of migration, the different education attainment between age cohorts in Mexico
and show the implications when analyzing migrant selection. Our claim is that in order
to properly study the self-selection of migrants, it is necessary to compare migrants to
non-migrants of the same age cohort.Acknowledgements
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Introduction
Migration is the result of a rational process. Individuals decide to leave their coun-
tries after assessing the potential beneﬁts and costs of such decision. The decision on
whether to return or not is the result of a rational calculation, as the initial migration de-
cision was. We analyse in this thesis the potential temporariness of migration and study
how migrants assess it. In addition, we show how migrants modify their behaviour in
the host country depending on their migration return intentions. Finally, we focus on
migrants’ selection in terms of skills, its correct assessment and the implications it
might have.
Chapter 2 analyzes the decision process underlying return migration using a dy-
namic model. In each period, migrants decide whether to stay in host country or to
return to home country, simultaneously with consumption and investment choices. The
decisions are taken comparing the discounted ﬂow of utility between staying for an
additional year and returning to the home country permanently, and depend on the cap-
ital invested in each country as well as on a series of stochastic shocks. The dynamic
model framework allows migrants to revise their decisions in each period, given shocks
in preferences for the home country and shocks in the relative income between the host
country and the home country. We use the German Socio-Economic Study (GSOEP)
panel data, which allows us to follow migrants from different countries for a period of
24 years. It also reveals their return intentions in each time period and whether they
return or not. We calibrate our model of return intentions and perform several policy
simulations. Our policy simulations illustrate the importance of economic prospects of
the home country on modifying migrants’ intentions to return to their home country,
and the limited effect of one-off monetary subsidies might have.11
It is important to understand migrants’ intentions not only for its own sake. Re-
turn intentions modify as well migrants’ behaviour while in the host country, and this
issued is analyzed in chapters 3 and 4. Chapter 3 studies how the intended stay in the
host country (or the potential return to the home country) modify migrants’ remittance
behaviour. We use the GSOEP data that provides unusual detail on remittances and
return plans, and follows the same household over time. Our data allows us also to
distinguish between different purposes of remittances. We analyze the association
between individual and household characteristics and the geographic location of the
family as well as return plans, and remittances. The panel nature of our data allows
us to condition on household ﬁxed effects. To address measurement error and reverse
causality, we use an instrumental variable estimator. Our results show that changes in
return plans are related to large changes in remittance ﬂows.
Return plans affect not only remittances but also savings and asset accumulation.
These issues are analyzed in Chapter 4 using the GSOEP dataset. We argue that not
only the amount of savings and assets may be related to future return plans accumu-
lation, but also if savings and assets are held in the home- and host country. Thus,
comparing savings and assets between immigrants and natives may lead to serious
underestimation when neglecting the home country component. We show that immi-
grants with temporary return plans place a higher proportion of their savings in the
home country. In addition, both the magnitude and the share of assets and housing
value accumulated in the home country are larger for immigrants who consider their
migration as temporary, and lower the value of assets and property held in the host
country. These decisions might have important implications for both home and host
countries’ asset and housing markets. Finally, and conditional on observable character-
istics, we ﬁnd no evidence that immigrants with temporary migration plans save more
than immigrants with permanent migration plans.
The last topic we analyse in this thesis is the selection in terms of skills of recent
migrants to the United States in chapter 5. Migrants are self-selected in terms of skills
with respect to the non-migrant populations of both home and host countries. This12
selection has important implications for both countries as the impact of migration on
the non-migrant population depends on it. In this chapter we stress the important age
gradientofmigration, thedifferenteducationattainmentbetweenagecohortsinMexico
and show the implications when analyzing migrant selection. Our results show that
it is necessary to compare migrants to non-migrants of the same age cohort in order
to properly analyse the self-selection of migrants. Our study shows that young male
migrants from Mexico are negatively selected in terms of education, wages and test
scores, which affects the impact their migration has in both host and home countries.Chapter 2
A Dynamic Model of Return
Migration
This chapter has been co-authored with J´ erˆ ome Adda and Christian Dustmann.2.1. Introduction 14
2.1 Introduction
The theoretical and empirical literature on migration has paid little attention to the fact
that many migrants return to their home countries after having spent a number of years
in the host country. This is surprising, since many migrations today are in fact tem-
porary. For instance, labor migrations from Southern to central Europe in the 1950’s
– 1970’s were predominantly temporary. Bohning (1987) estimates that ”more than
two thirds of the foreign workers admitted to the Federal Republic [of Germany], and
more than four ﬁfth in the case of Switzerland, have returned”. Glytsos (1988) reports
that of the one million Greeks migrating to West Germany between 1960 and 1984,
85% gradually returned home. Dustmann (1997) provides evidence for a substantial
out migration over that period for other European countries. Return migration is also
considerable for the United States. Jasso & Rosenzweig (1982) report that between
1908 and 1957 about 15.7 million persons immigrated to the United States and about
4.8 million aliens emigrated. They found that between 20% and 50% of legal immi-
grants (depending on the nationality) re-emigrated from the United States in the 1970’s.
Warren & Peck (1980) estimate that about one third of legal immigrants to the United
States re-emigrated in the 1960’s. Re-emigration rates in the United States and in sev-
eral European countries were estimated to be between 20% to 60% during the 1990’s
(OECD (2008), Dustmann & Weiss (2007)).
To understand the motives of return migrations, as well as the factors which ex-
plain variation in migration durations, is important for designing optimal migration
policies. The large labour migrations to Europe in the 1950’s to 1970’s were thought
to be temporary by the receiving countries and, in fact, many of these migrants did
eventually return.
Most countries want to attract the best workers for their local labour markets and
want to put in place migration schemes that allow them so do so. Furthermore, there
seems to be an understanding that it is desirable that these workers adopt easily to the
social and economic structure of the host country. From the side of the migrant, the in-
centive for any migration, as well as the incentives to assimilate are heavily interrelated
with the expected duration in the host region.
Little is known about the way migrants form their re-migration decisions. While
emigrations are easily explained by simple static models, where the driving force2.1. Introduction 15
are wage differentials between regions, re-migrations occur despite persistently more
favourable conditions in the host countries. Models which explain re-migrations must
therefore introduce non-monetary aspects which explain return migration, or deviate
from absolute measures of monetary wealth, consider decisions taken within family
units, or take a more dynamic perspective, where intertemporal substitution is a driving
force for return decisions.
The explanations found in the literature explaining why a return migration may be
optimal, despite persistently more favourable conditions in the host country, build on
such considerations. Stark & Taylor (1991) uses the theory of relative deprivation and
arguments of risk spreading to explain why migrants may return to a less rich econ-
omy or region. Djajic & Milbourne (1988) explain return migration by assuming that
migrants have a stronger preference for consumption at home than abroad. Dustmann
(1999) shows that return migration may be optimal if the host country currency has
a higher purchasing power in the home country, and if there are higher returns in the
home economy on human capital, acquired in the host country.
None of these models allow for revisions of return plans during the migrants’
migration history. They usually assume that the migrant has full information about the
host country, and that no unforseen shocks occur. Although these models give us some
insight into the factors which are responsible for re-migration decisions, they seem to
leave out two very important elements. First, habituation processes, which may lead
the migrant to revise former migration plans in the course of his/her migration history.
Second, shocks, or new information, which may lead the migrant to continuously revise
previous migration plans. To appropriately address these issues is only feasible in a
dynamic setting, where migration plans and their revisions are modeled explicitly.
In this paper, we develop a dynamic model of return migration. Migrants make
a decision each period whether to stay in the host country or to return to the country
of origin. The decisions taken are based on a comparison of the discounted ﬂow of
utility in the two locations and depend on the capital invested in each country, as well
as on a series of stochastic shocks. On the one hand there is a country speciﬁc shock
that reﬂects the economic conditions in the country of origin with respect to the host2.1. Introduction 16
country. On the other hand, there are shocks speciﬁc to the individual, which allow for
different stochastic inﬂuences across individuals. Migrants are allowed to re-optimize
their choices at every period after they have migrated. This feature is realistic: migrants
revise their plans during the migration history. There are many reasons that might mo-
tivate them to do so, such as changes in his preferences for staying in host country due
to habituation or unexpected changes in income.
Understanding the process of migrants’ re-migration decisions is not only impor-
tant for its own sake, though. The mere fact that some immigrants plan to return, while
others do not, induces heterogeneity in their behaviour, like remittances (see chapter 3
), savings and asset accumulation (see chapter 4), labour market behaviour, skill accu-
mulation, consumption, etc. This heterogeneity is a consequence among others of the
different economic situations they face after a return to their home countries, and which
they take into account when making current economic decisions. These differences in
plans may help to explain, for instance, differences in assimilation patterns between
immigrant populations with different origin, as found in a number of empirical studies1.
There is some research on the effect of return plans on migrants’ behavior. Djajic
(1989) emphasizes that in a guest worker system, changes in wages and prices in the
home country affect the migrant’s consumption and labor supply in the host country.
Galor & Stark (1990), Galor & Stark (1991) show that a return probability different
from zero affects migrants’ behavior and performance in the host country, if wages in
the home country differ from those in the host country. These models assume that re-
turn decisions are exogenous, and not optimally chosen by the immigrant. Dustmann
(1999) builds a model where human capital accumulation in the host country, and re-
turn migrations, are both chosen simultaneously. Dustmann (2000) explores the conse-
quences for the empirical analysis of migrants’ wage growth. If re-migration is chosen
optimally, then empirical models which do not condition on the migration duration are
misspeciﬁed, and may lead to biased parameter estimates.
Again, the process of forming return plans is modeled in a simplistic way. In our
framework, where migrants may constantly revise their return plans, it is possible to
1See, for instance, Borjas (1985) and Chiswick and Miller (1993).2.2. Data and Some Evidence on Return Migration 17
update past return plans given new information or shocks. In this way, return plans
are optimally chosen every period. From the perspective of the migrant and the host
country, this revision is desirable to avoid an incorrect assessment of migrants’ planned
duration of stay in the host country.
2.2 Data and Some Evidence on Return Migration
Many migrations nowadays are temporary. On average, four in ten long-term migrants
leave their host countries and re-migrate after ﬁve years of residence (OECD (2008)).
For the case of Germany, a large number of migrants enter the country and a large
number also leave it. Figure 2.1 shows inﬂows to and outﬂows from Germany during
the last forty years (1968-2008) for migrants from different countries of origin. The
ﬂuctuation patterns of both inﬂows and outﬂows are different for migrants from dif-
ferent countries of origin. This might suggest that home country speciﬁc economic
conditions matter in migration decisions, both to emigrate from the home country but
also to return to it.
In this paper, we use data from the ﬁrst 24 waves of the German Socio-Economic
Panel (GSOEP) for the years 1984 until 2007. This data set contains a boost sample of
immigrants (including some 1500 households in the ﬁrst wave) from the former labour
migration countries Spain, Italy, Greece, Yugoslavia, and Turkey. Migrants from these
countries were actively recruited during the late 1950’s - early 1970’s. Migrations were
intended to be temporary both by the immigrant, as well as by the German authorities.
However, no temporary residence permits were imposed, and migrants could stay per-
manently, if they wanted.
Our data has detailed information on individual characteristics, family back-
ground, and economic activities of migrants over the 24 years period. Furthermore,
each year there was a complementary survey addressed to immigrants about various
immigrant speciﬁc issues. One question refers to the migrant’s return plans. We deﬁne
as a temporary migrant those who want to return to their home country at some point
in the future. The migrant is asked whether s/he intends to return to the home country,
or to stay permanently in Germany. The exact wording of the question is ”How long2.2. Data and Some Evidence on Return Migration 18
do you want to live in Germany?” and the respondent can answer ”I want to remain
in Germany permanently”, ”I want to return within the next 12 months” or ”I want to
stay several more years in Germany”. For the last option, he can state the ”number of
years” he wishes to stay in Germany. Thus, in addition to the information regarding the
intention whether or not to return home, the sample also contains information about the
intended remaining time in the host country, in case migrants would like to return2, and
the completed migration spells until year 2007 for those who returned.
We provide some descriptive information about our data in table 2.1. In 1984, im-
migrants are on average 35 years old and have stayed in Germany for about 13 years.
More than 70 percent intend to stay in Germany only for a temporary period of time
(on average, 18 years) and return afterwards to their home country. The proportion of
individuals in the sample that wants to return decreases over time, due to both sam-
ple selection and changes in return intentions. Of those who were in the sample in
1984, almost one quarter returned back to their home country at some point during the
observational period (1984-2007).
Migrants change their return plans also during their stay in Germany. In table 2.2
we display cross-tabulations of intentions in subsequent years, where vertical entries
refer to year t and horizontal entries to year t   1. Of those who intended to return in
year t 1, about 82% still have the same intention in year t, but about 18% do not intend
to return any more in year t. Of those who did not want to return in t   1, almost one
quarter want to return in year t. This indicates the existence of substantial ﬂuctuations
in return plans over the migration cycle.
In addition, the intended duration of stay changes over the migration experience.
If a deterministic model was appropriate for explaining return plans, then responses
should be updated each year in a mechanical manner. For instance, if an individual
responds in year t to have the intention to remain for 5 more years abroad, then s/he
should respond in year t + 1 that s/he intends to remain only 4 more years, etc. This
pattern does clearly not occur in our sample. Figure 2.2 shows the changes in the
length of stay in the host country between one year and the following for those migrants
that declare their intention to return in both dates. We should observe all observations
2In case migrants intend to remain permanently, we will deﬁne the intended remaining time in the
host country as the time until retirement at age 65.2.2. Data and Some Evidence on Return Migration 19
concentrated around  1 if intentions were updated in a deterministic way. This is
clearly not the case for everyone. Only 20 percent update their intended stay in a
deterministic manner, while more than 30 percent declare the same intended stay in t
and t + 1 and almost 50 percent update their intentions in a different manner. Those
individualsthatdeclarethesameintendedstayintandint 1mightincludeindividuals
whodonotupdatetheirintentionsbecausetheyansweredquicklyaprobablereturndate
using an heuristic information process (instead of a systematic one), without making a
proper assessment when to return analyzing all alternatives, etc.
An additional example of how intended duration of stay is updated over the migra-
tion experience can be observed in Figure 2.3. The ﬁgures shows the intended duration
of stay of individuals who were still in Germany in 2007 during the migration history.
We can see how the intended duration of stay is modiﬁed during the stay in the host
country and not in a deterministic way. In fact, the average intended stay even increases
in the ﬁrst years since migration, to start decreasing over time afterwards.
As mentioned previously, GSOEP also has information on completed migration
spells. If migrants drop out of the panel because they return to their home country, this
information is recorded in the next wave of the panel. This allows us to compare return
intentions in 1984 (the ﬁrst year the data is collected) and the actual returns until 2006
- see table 2.3. Of those who planned to return in 1984, almost 30 percent did indeed
go back over the next 23 years. Of those who did not intend to return, 14 percent did in
fact go back over the next 23 years period. These numbers indicate that intentions and
realizations may vary quite considerably over the migration cycle.
We can compare as well the difference in years between intended and actual stay
durations for those who returned before 2007. The differences between their intended
return date and their actual return date are remarkable (ﬁgure 2.4). More than half
of the migrants who returned before 2007 declared in 1984 an intended time of stay
Germany close to their actual stay (plus or minus three years). However, almost half
of the migrants either underestimated or overestimated their stay by more than three
years.
The distribution of intended stay in the host country is shown in Figure 2.5.
Around 75 percent of those individuals that want to return intend to do so in the fol-
lowing ten years. Migrants are more likely to report round ﬁgures as intended duration2.3. The Model 20
of stay (e.g., 5 years, 10 years, 15 years, etc), as they might not know with certainty at
which exact date they plan to return. The distribution of intended stay in the host coun-
try varies as well with duration of stay (Figure 2.6). Those individuals that recently
arrived to the home country (between 0 to 9 years since migration) are more likely to
report longer intended stays than those who have already stayed in the host country for
longer and still want to return to their home country. In all categories, nevertheless,
migrants are more likely to give round numbers as intended stay durations.
2.3 The Model
In our model, the agent has in every period a choice of location between his country
of origin and the host country. Returning to his/her country of origin is a permanent
decision. In either of these locations, he derives a speciﬁc utility, which depends on
expenditures in that location, and the time spent there. At each period in time, the
agent allocates his income into consumption, c and savings, s. The stock of savings, S
is transferable across countries.
Let V (A;G;Y;;S;S;R) be the lifetime value of an individual of age A, who
has been in the host country for G years and with a stock of asset S. Y is the GDP in
the home country, relative to the host country.  is a shock to preferences, while in the
host country. S and R are two taste shocks, assumed to be iid and which follow an
extreme value distribution. Let V Stay(A;G;Y;) be the value of staying one additional
period in the host country and V Return(A;G;Y;S) the value of going back to the home
country permanently at the beginning of the period. The value is then deﬁned as:
V (A;G;Y;;S;S;R) = max

V
Stay(A;G;Y;) + S;V
Return(A;G;Y;S) + R
	
(2.1)
The agent compares at each period the value of staying for one additional period
and the value of returning at the beginning of the period. The value of staying is deﬁned
as:
V
Stay(A;G;Y;) = u
Stay(G;;c
S) + EY ;0jY;;S;RV (A + 1;G + 1;Y
0;
0) (2.2)2.3. The Model 21
and the value of returning as:
V
Return(A;G;Y;S) = max
cR u
Return(A   G;c
R) + EY 0jYV
Return(A + 1;G;Y
0;S
0)
(2.3)
The utility derived in the host country uStay, depends on the time spent in this
country, G, on the realization of the taste shock,  and on the consumption in this
country, cS. The consumption in host is ﬁxed at cR = 1   , as  is the percentage of
income devoted to savings in host country. The taste shock follows a Markov process,
and the agent has rational expectation over future realizations 0. In the home country,
the agent derives utility from consumption cS and from the time spent in that country
A   G.
The agent migrates to the host country, either because he has a strong preference
for the host country (a high ), or because the host country offers a better technology to
increase his savings S. Given the stochastic nature of the taste shocks, the agent does
not know with certainty the date at which he plans to return. Changes on its migration
status or on the type of permit he holds in the host country could enter in the model
as a shock to the preference parameter . For example, after an amnesty, the relative
preference for staying one year longer in the host country will be higher (due to the
lower risk deportation, etc.).
This fact can have important consequences on the optimal strategy. If the agent
has a preference for the host country, he would still need to accumulate some savings
S, at least in the early years when G is not high enough to offset any big shocks on R.
Conversely, an agent might stay in the host country for longer than he had planned for
after a negative shock, increasing his duration in the host country, G. This increased
stay in the host country, due to an habituation effect, might then modify his previous
plans and the updated optimal plans for the migrant will be to stay longer than initially
planned. For some agents, this might even lead to a permanent settlement in the host
country, although their ﬁrst intention was to go back to their country of origin after
a small number of years. The model is able to produce a probability of leaving the
country which are either decreasing or increasing in the number of years spent in the
host country.
As we mention previously, in our model return is an absorving state (i.e., the2.3. The Model 22
migrant cannot decide to re-migrate again to the host country). This feature is realistic
for the case of guest-workers in Germany, that were hired on a temporary basis and with
a foreseen return to the home country. It does not allow however for other situations,
like seasonal workers that might migrate to the host country every year for some time
and return back home afterwards, or other types of migrants that might also go back
and forth between home and host countries.
Speciﬁcation of Preferences:The utility functions are expressed as:
8
<
:
uStay(G;;cS) = cSG
uReturn(A   G;cR) = cR(A   G)
where G is the duration in the host country and A is the age of the agent. The utility
function has two main components: the utility derived from consumption times the
utility derived from longer stay in each location. The duration of stay in the host coun-
try G is at least one year whenever comparing the utilities between staying or returning
by deﬁnition, and it increases during the stay in the host country. The duration of stay
in the home country prior to migration (A-G) could be however permanently low for
those migrants that entered the host country at very young age, which implies very low
potential utility levels in the home country. The utility functions are such that the the
marginal utility of consumption is reinforcing in the stocks. This is similar to addiction
or habit formation.
 measures the relative taste for German life.  is restricted to have zero or
positive values. No upper bound is imposed, if a migrant receives a positive schock
that increases their relative preference for the host country greatly, he will decide to
stay longer in the country, maybe even not to return back home. Nevertheless, most
individuals that want to return will have relative preference parameters between [0,1)
in order to have incentives to go back to the host country.
The taste shock is assumed to follow an autoregressive process of order 1:
t = (1   ) + t 1 + ut with ut  N(0;
2
u)
which we will approximate by a ﬁrst order Markov process (see Tauchen & Hussey
(1991)).2.3. The Model 23
Income Shocks: The income processes is modelled as an AR(1) process
Y
0 = (1   Y)Y + YY + Y
Y  N(0;Y
2)
This modelisation imposes an income process that is the same for all immigrants
from the same country of origin. In this sense, this variable should be interpreted as a
measureofrelativeeconomicprospectsofthehomecountryrelativetothehostcountry,
rather than the individual relative income. 3
Intentions:We can compute the probability of returning to the home country at age At,
conditional on still being in the country at age At 1 as :
P
R
t = P
R(At;Gt;Yt;t;St) =
exp(V Return(At;Gt;Yt;St))
exp(V Return(At;Gt;Yt;St))) + exp(V Stay(At;Gt;Yt;t))
(2.4)
due to the extreme value distribution of the shocks R and S.
We denote T R as the random variable representing time until return. The proba-
bility at date t that the agent returns after k periods is :
P(T
R = t + k) = P
R
t+k
k 1 Y
l=0
(1   P
R
t+l) (2.5)
We interpret the intention as the expected time the migrant will be willing to stay
in the host country until return:
It = Eft+k;Yt+kg1
k=0jt;Yt
1 X
l=0
lP(T
R = t + l) (2.6)
where the expectation is taken over all possible future paths for the taste shock t and
the relative wage Yt. This expectation is non trivial to evaluate as it requires to calculate
an inﬁnite integral. Instead, we approximate it by simulations:
It(At;Gt;Yt;St;t) =
1
S
S X
s=1
1 X
l=0
lP
R
s (T
R = t + l) (2.7)
3An alternative would be to model using the individual income of the individual in the host country,
which would take into account speciﬁc income shocks occurring to individuals. In that case, it will allow
for changes in the relative position of the individual in the host country and the variable will have a
different interpretation.2.4. Calibration 24
where P R
s (T R = l) is the probability of returning in period l, computed with a given
path indexed by s, ft+k;Yt+kg1
k=0, for the taste shock and the relative wage.
From Intentions to Preferences: Finally, we denote I 1 the inverse of the in-
tention function, which maps a given intention to a taste shock, conditional on age A,
years since migration G, income Y and savings S.
t = I
 1(At;Gt;Yt;St;it) (2.8)
We approximate the AR(1) process  with a Markov chain with two values,  high
and  low, following Tauchen (1986) procedure. Then, doing a linear interpolation, we
deﬁne the  that rationalizes the intention I as
t = I
 1(At;Gt;Yt;St;it) 
It(At;Gt;Yt;St;  )   It(At;Gt;Yt;St;)
It(At;Gt;Yt;St;  )   It(At;Gt;Yt;St;)
(    ) + 
(2.9)
LikelihoodThe likelihood of observing a sequence of intended durations is
P(i0;i1;:::;it) = P(itjit 1):::P(i1ji0)P(i0) (2.10)
as the probability of observing it in t is conditional on observing it 1 in t   1.
The probability of observing an intention of it at arrival is
P(i0) = P(I(0;At;Y0;0)) = P(0 = I
 1(0;At;Y0;i0)) =
=
1
q
2
u
1 2

'(
0   (1   ) q
2
u
1 2

) (2.11)
P(itjit 1) = P(t = I
 1(At;Gt;Yt;it)jt 1 = I
 1(At 1;Gt 1;Yt 1;it 1)) =
=
1
u
'(
t   (1   )   t 1
u
) (2.12)
2.4 Calibration
For each year the individual is present in the sample, we observe the number of years
this individual intend to stay, his age, the number of years since migration as well as the2.4. Calibration 25
relative mean income in his home country with respect to Germany. This data forms
the basis for our calibration.
For a given vector of parameters , the probability that the individual will stay I
years in Germany is computed, conditional on having been there n years. The inten-
tion is stochastic as the individual faces taste shocks in each period. Let’s denote that
probability (I;n). These probabilities are computed numerically, by calculating all
possible sequences for the taste shocks.
Obviously, individuals are different. We allow for one type of heterogeneity in
the model. Given the shocks to preferences, agents are ex post different in terms of
intention to stay.4
As time in Germany pass on, immigrants face different realizations for their pref-
erence shocks. Those who draw adverse taste shocks revise their intended time in
Germany downwards and return earlier. Those who face good shocks revise their in-
tended length of stay upwards. This arises for two reasons. First, the preference shocks
are persistent so a good shock today means that future shocks will be good as well.
Second, as our model display habit formation, the longer the individual have been in
Germany, the higher are his intentions to remain there.
Table 2.4 displays the calibrated coefﬁcients for our the data. We included all
migrants born in Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia, Italy or Spain aged 17-65 during the
period 1984-2007. The savings rate  used is equal to the average savings observed
for those groups of migrants in the data (estimated in Dustmann & Mestres (2010b)).
The income process is predicted as an AR(1) process using the observed relative per
capita GDP between the host country and migrant’s home countries for the period
1984-2007.5 The rest of parameters , , ,  and u are calibrated such that the
4However, there could be as well an ex ante heterogeneity in the data. Prior to emigrating, immigrants
couldhavedifferentviewsonhowlongtheywanttostayinGermany. ThosewithahightasteforGerman
life, will eventually stay longer. To accommodate this heterogeneity, we should allow different types of
individuals in the model as in Heckman & Singer (1984). However, this heterogeneity is not taken into
account in this calibration exercise, as the share (and number) of types will imply an additional ad-hoc
estimation.
5In this sense, this variable should be interpreted as a measure of relative economic prospects of the
home country relative to the host country, rather than the individual relative income in both destinations.2.4. Calibration 26
percentage of variation explained by the model is as close as possible to the total varia-
tion. The percentage of explained variations by the model is 78 percent. The calibration
results predict in a mean stay of 18.86 years, compared to a observed mean stay of 19.2.
Figure 2.7 compares the observed intention of stay with the predicted one from
our model. Predicted intentions refer to the average individual observed in our data
(who is 35 years old and has stayed already 15 years in Germany in 1984). Observed
intentions refer to the intentions of those individuals with same age and years of res-
idence in Germany (plus minus two years) observed in the data. Migrants that stay in
Germany revise their expected intentions upwards during their migration period. The
model captures fairly well this updating of expectations observed in the data.
Figure 2.8 and Figure 2.9 perform a similar comparison between predicted and
observed intentions for younger individuals with shorter stays and older individuals
with longer stays. Figure 2.8 shows the intentions of individuals aged 25 and that have
stayed only 5 years in Germany in 1984. For those younger individuals with shorter
stays, the model does not predict as accurately the observed intentions, in particular
on the ﬁrst years of residence in Germany. For older individuals with longer stays, the
model does seem to predict pretty closely the observed intentions in the data (see ﬁgure
2.9).
The predicted intentions obtained using the calibration exercise are sensitive to
the parameters chosen to different degrees. On the one hand, predicted intentions are
not very sensitive to the chosen savings rate parameter  or to the relative income pa-
rameters (to a smaller extent). On the other hand, preference parameters do modify
signiﬁcantly the predicted intentions in the calibration. A higher average relative pref-
erence for staying in Germany  reduces the probability of return and increases the
duration of stay in the host country. In addition, the results are sensitive to the relative
weight of  and . Those combinations of parameters where  has a higher relative
weight than  (like for the chosen calibrated parameters) have a much higher explana-
An alternative would be to use the actual individual income of the individual in the host country, which
would take into account speciﬁc income shocks occurring to them.2.5. Policy Analysis 27
tory power than the opposite.
2.5 Policy Analysis
The construction and calibration of the dynamic model allows to study the effect of dif-
ferent policies on migrant return intentions, our main objective. This section develops
different policy scenarios and the effects they have on migrant intentions following the
model developed earlier.
The ﬁrst policy simulation consists on a policy that gives a subsidy to those indi-
viduals who return to their home country 6. The subsidy should induce those individu-
als who want to return to anticipate their return. The real effect should be to help those
migrants who want to return but have not reach yet their savings target in Germany.
The effects of giving a subsidy equivalent to the income earned during half a year and
during one year are shown in Figure 2.10. As in the previous section, the intentions
correspond to the average individual observed in our data in terms of age and length
of residence in Germany. The ﬁgure shows that the effect of a subsidy modiﬁes only
slightly the intentions to return of migrants at any point of their migration. On average,
a subsidy equivalent to the income earned during half a year induces the individual to
reduce their intended stay in Germany by 100 days. A subsidy equivalent to one year
income will induce a reduction on their intended stay of 208 days. In both cases, and
at different durations of stay, migrants only reduce slightly their intended stay in Ger-
many. Thus only those migrants that were intending to return in the very near future
will anticipate their return, and the impact of such the policy will be very limited.
The second policy simulation corresponds to the impact of a change in the eco-
nomic conditions in the home country. A 20 % increase in the relative income of
the home country increases the probability of return to the home country and reduces
the intended duration of stay in Germany (see Figure 2.11). The increase in relative
income shown is equivalent to the increase in Spanish gdp per capita with respect to
the German gdp observed from 1984 to 2007, the period of study of the data 7. On
average, the model predicts that the average migrant will reduce their intended stay by
6The subsidy could be offered either by the host country or by the home country.
7During this period, the Spanish gdp per capita converged from 74.2% to 88.1% of the German gdp
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980 days (over two and a half years). The effect is heterogenous along the migration
experience, being much larger at younger age and shorter stays. A migrant aged 35
and who stayed 15 years in Germany will reduce his intentions to stay in Germany by
1237 days (almost three and a half years shorter intended stay). At older age and longer
residence in Germany, the intentions however are almost unchanged.
Not only the average economic conditions of the home country, but also its eco-
nomic stability affects migrants intentions. Figure 2.12 compares the effect of home
country economic conditions in our model between an average of all home countries
in the data versus Turkey’s economic conditions during the period studied. During
that period, Turkey has a lower mean income, lower persistence and higher income
volatility 8. A Turkish migrant will have a longer intended stay in Germany than the
average migrant due to the different economic conditions in his home country. This
difference in intended duration of stay in Germany is reduced the closer the migrant is
to retirement age.
2.6 Conclusions
This study has developed a dynamic model to explain migrants’ plans to return to their
home country and how those are updated during the migration experience.
The policy simulations shown in the previous section have highlighted the dif-
ferent impacts that different policies and changes in the economic conditions of home
countries can have in migrant return intentions.
Many countries have developed assisted voluntary return programs to incentivate
migrants to return to their home countries. However, those programs have had only
moderate success (OECD (2008)). The policy simulations performed in this chapter
help explaining the small take-up rate of these return programs. The monetary subsidy
offered is not sufﬁcient to reduce migrants’ intended stay in the host country to a level
on which their return will be immediate. As migrants’ intentions are only reduced
slightly, subsidy programs have only a limited effect on anticipating actual returns.
The policy simulations using our model show as well that an important aspect mi-
8More precisely, Turkish relative gdp during the period observed, modeled as AR(1), is equal to
(Y = 0:0607;Y = 0:8079;Y = 0:0009).2.6. Conclusions 29
grants take into account are the economic conditions of the home country. Migrants’ in-
tentions to return to their home country are substantially increased when the economic
conditions of their home countries improve. Migrants are more likely to consider an
early return to their home country when it can offer them economic prosperity. If not,
they might not consider to return there, or at least not until retirement age.
This ﬁrst chapter has considered the formation of migrants’ intentions to stay in
the host country and how they might be altered. The next two chapters will analyze the
effect of changes in migrant’s intentions to stay in the host country on migrant’s be-
haviour there. In particular, chapter 3 will analyze the effect of intentions on remitting
behaviour and chapter 4 on saving and asset holding behaviour.Graph 1: Inflows and outflows of migrants in Germany by selected countries of origin, 1968-2008
Note: Statistisches Bundesamt, 1968-2008. Yugoslavia includes from 1992 to 2008 all the countries that previously formed Yugoslavia. 
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Figure 2.1: Inﬂows and outﬂows of migrants in Germany by selected countries of ori-
gin, 1968-2008
30Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev.
Age 35.2 13.0 41.3 12.9 45.7 11.0
Age at arrival 22.0 10.7 20.2 10.0 17.4 9.0
Years since migration 13.1 5.6 21.1 8.6 28.3 9.9
Year of arrival in Germany 1970.9 5.6 1974.9 8.6 1978.7 9.9
Intention to return (1=Yes; 0=No) 71.5% 45.1% 51.3% 50.0% 37.5% 48.5%
Intended stay duration (years) 18.1 16.5 20.6 14.0 18.7 11.2
Actual return  (1=Yes; 0=No) 24.8% 43.2% 14.1% 34.8% 0.9% 9.5%
Country of origin:
Turkey 36.7% 48.2% 42.6% 49.5% 49.1% 50.0%
Yugoslavia 18.5% 38.8% 23.2% 42.2% 23.3% 42.3%
Italy 18.4% 38.7% 16.4% 37.1% 16.4% 37.0%
Greece 14.0% 34.7% 11.7% 32.2% 7.7% 26.7%
Spain 12.5% 33.1% 6.1% 23.9% 3.5% 18.4%
Number Observations
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
1984 1996 2007
Note: GSOEP, 1984-2007.
2946 1468 660
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
31Table 2: Variations in return plans
Intention to Return in t
Intention to Return in t-1
No Yes Total
Yes 2753 12135 14888
% 18.49 81.51 100
No 7991 2568 10559
% 75.68 24.32 100
Total 10744 14703 25447
42.22 57.78 100
Note: GSOEP, 1984-2007.
Table 2.2: Variations in return plans
32Graph 2: Changes in return intentions (difference in years)
Note: GSOEP, 1984-2007.
Figure 2.2: Changes in return intentions (difference in years)
33Graph 4: Intentions of migrants over time
Note: GSOEP, 1984-2007.
Figure 2.3: Intentions of migrants over time
34Table 3: Differences between intention to return in 1984 and actual return (prior to 2007)
Year of return No Yes Total
No return 654 1,353 2,007
1985 19 137 156
1986 5 47 52
1987 8 43 51
1988 12 55 67
1989 3 37 40
1990 10 24 34
1991 5 19 24
1992 11 13 24
1993 2 23 25
1994 7 29 36
1995 3 22 25
1996 6 21 27
1997 4 14 18
1998 5 15 20
1999 0 15 15
2000 1 12 13
2001 5 13 18
2002 0 8 8
2003 1 8 9
2004 3 8 11
2005 1 7 8
2006 1 3 4
Total 766 1,926 2,692
Note: GSOEP, 1984-2007.
Intention to Return in 1984
Table 2.3: Differences between intention to return in 1984 and actual return (prior to
2007)
35Graph 3: Difference in years between intended and actual stay durations
Note: GSOEP, 1984-2007.
Figure 2.4: Difference in years between intended and actual stay durations
36Note: GSOEP, 1984-2007. Intended number of years of stay in the host country before return.
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Figure 2.5: Distribution of Migration Intentions
37Note: GSOEP, 1984-2007. Intended number of years of stay in the host country before return.
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Figure 2.6: Distribution of Migration Intentions by Duration of Stay
38Table 4: Calibrated coefficients
Mean Predicted Stay 18.68
Mean Observed Stay 19.2
R-Square 0.78
Parameters
γ 0.15
α 0.3
Savings Rate
ρ 0.074
Income*
 Y 0.4657
σε 0.00001
ρY 0.8817
Preferences
 λ 1
σu 0.3
ρλ 0.8
Observed savings rate during the period equal to 7.4% - see Table 4.2, chapter 2.
* Income coefficients: coefficients from an estimated AR(1) process of the relative 
gdp between home and host country (1984-2007).  
Rest of coefficients chosen such that predicted stay as close as possible to 
observed stay. 
Table 2.4: Calibrated coefﬁcients
39Graph 5: Observed Intention vs. Predicted Intention 
Note: GSOEP, 1984-2007.
Predicted intentions of an individual aged 35 and who stayed in Germany for 15 years in 1984. Average observed 
intentions of individuals aged 35 (+/- 2 years) and who stayed 15 (+/- 2 years) years in 1984. N=192 in 1985, N=47 
in 2006.
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Figure 2.7: Observed Intention vs. Predicted Intention - Individual Aged 35 and 15
Years Since Migration
40Graph 5b: Observed Intention vs. Predicted Intention - 25th 
Note: GSOEP, 1984-2007.
Predicted intentions of an individual with 25th percentile characteristics, that is, aged 25 and who stayed in 
Germany for 5 years in 1984. Average observed intentions of individuals aged 25 (+/- 2 years) and who stayed 5 
(+/- 2 years) years in 1984. N=91 in 1984, N=14 in 2006.
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Figure 2.8: Observed Intention vs. Predicted Intention - Individual Aged 25 and 5
Years Since Migration
41Graph 5c: Observed Intention vs. Predicted Intention - 75th
Note: GSOEP, 1984-2007.
Predicted intentions of an individual with 75th percentile characteristics, that is, aged 45 and who stayed in Germany for 25 
years in 1984. Average observed intentions of individuals aged 45 (+/- 2 years) and who stayed 25 (+/- 2 years) years in 
1984. N=138 in 1984, N=7 in 2006.
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Figure 2.9: Observed Intention vs. Predicted Intention - Individual Aged 45 and 15
Years Since Migration
42Graph 5: Effect of subsidy to return to home country
Note: GSOEP, 1984-2007. Calibrated coefficients (table 2.4.). Individuals with average age (35) and years since migration (15) in 1984.
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Figure 2.10: Effect of subsidy to return to home country
43Graph 6: Effect of change in relative income
Note: GSOEP, 1984-2007. Calibrated coefficients (table 2.4.). Individuals with average age (35) and years since migration (15) in 1984.
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Figure 2.11: Effect of change in relative income
44Note: GSOEP, 1984-2007. Calibrated coefficients (table 2.4.). Individuals with average age (35) and years since migration (15) in 1984.
Average economic conditions in home country versus Turkey's economic conditions during 1984 - 2007 (lower mean income, lower persistence and higher income volatility).
Graph 7: Effect of different home country economic conditions: average versus Turkish economic conditions (lower mean income, lower persistence and higher 
income volatility)
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Figure 2.12: Effect of different home country economic conditions
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Remittances and Temporary
Migration
This chapter has been co-authored with Christian Dustmann and has been published in Journal of
Development Economics, Volume 92, pages 62-70, 2010. We are grateful to two anonymous referees
and the editor for constructive comments and to Jerome Adda and Frank Windmeijer for discussions.3.1. Introduction 47
3.1 Introduction
The amount of remittances sent by immigrants back to their home countries has in-
creased steadily over the last decades. Currently, the volume of remittances to devel-
oping countries using formal channels is estimated to be over $240 billion (Ratha et al.
(2007)). Their level is higher than ofﬁcial development aid and close to foreign di-
rect investment and other capital inﬂows for developing countries. Remittances help
economic development and are a major factor in poverty reduction1. In addition, re-
mittances are now one of the primary sources of foreign exchange for many receiving
countries.
For immigration countries, remittances constitute a non-negligible outﬂow of cap-
ital. Recent ﬁgures suggest that the outﬂow of remittances from high income OECD
countries is over $136 billion (Ratha et al. (2007)). For instance, in Germany the vol-
ume of remittances was about 0.31% of GDP in 2003 (Bundesbank (2008)).2 This
was equivalent to 150 % of Germany’s total budget for ofﬁcial development aid in that
year3.
It is therefore not surprising that a large literature has developed on the subject,
see Docquier & Rapoport (2006) for an excellent survey. Key issues to understand are
which migrant populations remit, for which purpose, and what determines the amount
of remittances. Answers to these questions may help to create migration schemes that
affect the way remittances are channeled into different purposes, thus supporting their
optimal efﬁciency for economic development, and raising awareness about how differ-
ent policies will lead to different incentives to remit.
A number of papers develop models for the different motives that may trigger
remittances, and explore some of their empirical implications.4 This research has pro-
vided us with a wealth of insight. Yet, on the empirical level we still know relatively
1See e.g. Adams (2006a), Adams (2006b) and Acosta et al. (2006) for analysis.
2Germany is the third largest source country of remittances payments, after United States and Saudi
Arabia, see Ratha (2003).
3Ofﬁcial Development Assistance accounted for 0.21% of GDP in Germany in 2003, see OECD
(2005).
4See e.g. Lucas& Stark(1985), Lucas& Stark(1988), Hoddinott(1994), Funkhouser (1995), Poirine
(1997), Agarwal & Horowitz (2002), de la Briere et al. (2002), Faini (2006), Okonkwo Osili (2007),
Amuedo-Dorantes & Pozo (2006) and Hanson (2007).3.2. Remittances and return migration 48
little about the determinants of remittances, the various forms remittances may take,
and how these interact with migrant behavior and the forms of migration. One partic-
ular aspect, which is in our view important, is the way the permanency of a migration
affects the magnitude and purpose of remittance ﬂows.
We address these questions in this paper. We analyze how remittance ﬂows are
related to the permanency of migration, and to the residential location of the family.
Our empirical analysis is based on a panel data set of immigrants over the period from
1984-1994. This data contains repeated information about whether, and what amount
of remittances is sent. It also distinguishes between remittances for family support,
savings, and for a residual category ”other purposes”. Due to the information our data
provides us about the return plans of immigrants, we are able to distinguish between in-
dividuals who consider their migration as temporary, and who consider their migration
as permanent. The panel nature of our data, and repeated information on remittances
as well as return intentions, allows us to explore and isolate the way the permanence of
migration, as well as the locational distribution of the family, affect remittance ﬂows,
conditional on observed characteristics and unobserved ﬁxed differences across house-
holds in their remittance propensity. We address measurement error problems and pos-
sible feedback of past remittances on current return plans by combining a ﬁxed effects
estimator with an IV strategy.
The structure of the paper is as follows: in section 2 we discuss the way remit-
tances may be affected by return plans, and introduce our estimation strategy. In sec-
tion 3 we provide some background information and discuss the data and our sample.
In section 4 we show our estimation results, and section 5 concludes.
3.2 Remittances and return migration
A difﬁculty with remittances is its measurement and exact deﬁnition. If we deﬁne re-
mittances as all transfers from the immigration country to the immigrant’s home coun-
try (a deﬁnition which we will follow below), then remittance ﬂows consist of both
transfers to support family and kinship in the origin country, as well as savings or in-
vestments for future consumption at home. The motivation for both types of transfers
is different. While the ﬁrst requires altruistic behavior and/or inﬂuence through the so-
cial reference group, the second can be modeled in a simple life cycle model (see e.g.3.2. Remittances and return migration 49
Dustmann (1997)).
Transfers for both family support and savings purposes may differ according to
whether the migration is considered as temporary or as permanent. Remittances to sup-
portfamilyandkinshipcanbeviewedasintra-familytransfersacrossnationalborders.5
Thus, if temporary migrants have more of their (extended) family living abroad, they
may remit more. Further, remittances may also respond to expectations about fulﬁll-
ment of family and social commitments. Satisfying these expectations can be seen as a
price to be paid for the option to return back home at a later stage, or as an ”insurance”
to be welcomed in the home community after returning. Also this motive would result
in higher remittances of temporary migrants.6
Remittance ﬂows may further be motivated by the wish to hold assets or savings
in the home country. These may take the form of housing stock, capital investments,
or simply savings. Thus, remittances motivated in this way are not different from an
intertemporalallocationofconsumption, orinvestmentintodurableconsumptiongoods
across national borders.7 A positive probability of return may affect these transactions
either by inducing a preference to holding assets and savings in the home country, or
by inducing immigrants to shift more consumption from the present to the future, or
both.
3.2.1 Empirical speciﬁcation
Our main interest is in determining how the level of remittances is affected by house-
hold characteristics, and by immigrants’ return plans. We estimate regressions of the
following type:
Yit = a0 + a1Xit + Rit + i + uit ; (3.1)
where Yit measures remittances, and the indices i and t denote households and
5See Lucas & Stark (1985) for an early discussion. See Cox (1987), Cox et al. (1998) for empirical
analysis of altruistic motives for private transfers. For a recent survey on the private transfer literature
see Laferrere & Wolff (2000).
6Azam & Gubert (2006) stresses the role of the extended family and the village in migration and
remittance decisions. Amuedo-Dorantes & Pozo (2006) investigates this motive empirically.
7As Durand et al. (1996) recognizes, ”sending monthly remittances (...) and returning home with
savings are interrelated behaviors that represent different ways of accomplishing the same thing: repa-
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time. The key variable of interest is Rit, which is a measure of the temporariness of
the migration. As we explain below in more detail, we obtain this variable from survey
questions on the migrant’s intention to return home, which we observe in every wave
of the panel that we use. These intentions may change over the migration history, and
they may not always correspond to whether the migration has ﬁnally been permanent.
But it is exactly these plans about a future return that determine remittance behavior.
The vector Xit collects characteristics of the household and the head of household.
We include here the log of disposable household income, the number of adults and the
number of children (below the age of 16) living in the household, and the number of
employed household members. We also include characteristics of the head of house-
hold, like the gender, the employment status, the years since migration and its square,
the number of years of education, and whether the partner is native born or the house-
hold head is single. Further, we include variables about whether the spouse or children
are living abroad, and an indicator variable whether the head of household grew up in
a rural area.
3.2.2 Identiﬁcation
There are a number of problems with the estimation of equation (3.1). First, individu-
als who tend to return may at the same time have a higher (lower) propensity to send
remittances. In this case, our estimate of  will be possibly upward (downward) bi-
ased, as the individual effect i will be correlated with return intentions Rit, so that
E(ijX;R) 6= 0.8 Some of this bias is likely to be eliminated by conditioning on the
variables in X.
A further problem is that return intentions are likely to be measured with (possi-
bly considerable) measurement error, thus creating an attenuation bias. In this case the
”observed” return intention equals R
it = Rit + Mit. We assume here that the mea-
surement error Mit has the ”classical” properties of being uncorrelated with the true
intention and being serially uncorrelated (E(Rit;Mit) = 0, E(Mit;Mis) = 0;t 6= s).
The downward bias is greatly exacerbated when estimating the model in differences or
using ﬁxed effects (see e.g. Hsiao (1986) for a detailed discussion).
8If on the other hand, these individuals tend to save more in the host country rather than to remit,
then the bias may be downwards.3.2. Remittances and return migration 51
Finally, remittances in previous periods may affect later return plans. For instance,
past remittances, invested into assets or durable consumption goods, may have created
returns that lead immigrants to change their current return intentions. This would imply
that
Rit = b0 + b1Xit +
t 1 X
s=1
dsYis + i + vit : (3.2)
If a positive shock to past remittances positively affects present return plans (ds >
0), then this would lead to a downward bias when using a difference or a ﬁxed effects
estimator. We deal with these problems by combining a ﬁxed effect type estimation
strategy (using within household variation for estimation only) with an instrumental
variable estimator. The idea of our estimation strategy is as follows. In a ﬁrst step, we
eliminate the ﬁxed effects by using a ”forward orthogonal deviations” transformation
(Arellano (2003)). This transformation removes the ﬁxed effects by subtracting from
each observation t = 1;:::;T  1 the mean of the remaining future observations (rather
than the mean of all observations, as does the standard FE estimator) in the sample.
The forward orthogonal deviations transformation of a variable Xit is deﬁned as X0
it =
p
(T   1)=(T   t + 1)(Xit   1
T 1
PT
s=t+1 Xis) (see Arellano (2003) and Arellano &
Bover (1995) for more details), so that equation (3.1) is transformed into
Y
0
it = a1X
0
it + R
0
it + 
0
it ; 
0
it = u
0
it   M
0
it (3.3)
This transformation eliminates the ﬁxed effect, but not the measurement error
problem and the problem that past levels of remittances may affect future return in-
tentions, so that pooled estimation of (3.3) would still lead to biased and inconsistent
estimates. We therefore instrument the forward deviations using past return intentions
of other household members as instruments. If the measurement error has the ”classi-
cal” properties we describe above, and if future shocks to remittances are not correlated
with past return intentions (as in 3.2), then past values of return intentions are appro-
priate instrumental variables.
The estimator could be implemented by using pooled 2SLS estimation. However,
this estimator is inefﬁcient as it does not use all instrumental variables available in
each period. More efﬁcient is a GMM type estimator as in Arellano & Bond (1991),
whichmakesuseofallinstrumentsavailableineachperiod. Weuseheretheorthogonal3.2. Remittances and return migration 52
deviations GMM estimator as suggested by Arellano & Bover (1995) (see also Arellano
(2003) or Roodman (2006)).
We should mention that, although our estimation strategy eliminates the main
problems in estimating the effects of return plans on remittances, other processes of
feedback between return intentions and remittances may be present. For instance, our
estimator is invalid if future remittances affect current return plans of other household
members, conditional on observables. While we believe that the mechanism in (3.2)
(where past remittances affect current return plans), addressed by our estimation strat-
egy, is plausible, we ﬁnd it difﬁcult to make a case for why future remittances should
affect current return intentions.
We should mention that the intention to return might well be jointly decided with
family location or employment and earnings. Our estimator might solve part of this
endogeneity problem if past intentions if past intentions are not related with current
family location or current earnings. However, if that is not the case, the coefﬁcient on
return intentions will be biased.
3.2.3 Selection through return migration
A remaining problem with the interpretation of the parameters is that our sample is
selected - over the course of the panel, we observe more households who have a higher
propensity to stay permanently. This selection may be correlated with our measure for
a return migration intention: those with a higher intention to return will be less likely to
be in the sample. If those who remain in the sample have different remittance behavior
(conditional on all the variables we include in the model as well as the measure for the
return intention), then this will bias our estimate for .
This bias can be signed under some assumptions: it will be downward if the resid-
uals in the selection equation and the remittance equation are positively correlated (in-
dicating that those who remain in the sample remit less than those who drop out of the
sample due to return, conditional on other regressors)9. In that case we can interpret
9More formally, suppose that the latent index for being selected into the sample, s is linear in RI,
the return intention, with s
i = 0 + RIi + ei, and that an individual is in the sample if s
i > 0.
Suppose that the outcome equation is given by yi = 0 + RIi + fi , and assume that ei and fi are
jointly normally distributed, with variances 1 and 2
v and correlation coefﬁcient . Then selection could
be accounted for by adding the generalized residual E(fijs
i > 0) = (ci) to the estimation equation,3.3. Background, data and descriptive evidence 53
the coefﬁcients on the temporary migration measure as a lower bound. However, it is
also theoretically possible that the residuals in the selection equation and the remittance
equation are negatively correlated indicating that those who remain in the sample remit
more (after accumulating more host-country speciﬁc human capital, for example). In
this case, the estimates will no longer be a lower bound.
When conditioning on individual effects, this problem will disappear if selection
is based on ”permanent” characteristics, as in this case the selection term is constant
over time and is eliminated.
3.3 Background, data and descriptive evidence
3.3.1 Background
Between the mid 1950’s and 1973, the strong economic development in Northern Eu-
rope and the resulting demand for labor led to a large inﬂow of immigrants mainly from
the periphery countries of Europe, but also from Turkey, North Africa, South America
and Asia. The main receiving countries were Belgium, France, Germany, the Nether-
lands, Switzerland, and the Scandinavian countries.
The West-German economy experienced a strong upward swing after 1955, ac-
companied by a sharp fall in the unemployment rate (between 1955 and 1960, the un-
employment rate fell from 5.6 % to 1.3 %) and an increase in labor demand. This gen-
erated a large immigration of workers from Southern European countries and Turkey
into Germany. The percentage of foreign-born workers employed in West Germany in-
creasedfrom0.6percentin1957to5.5percentin1965, andto11.2percentin1973. Bi-
lateral recruitment agreements were set up between Germany and Italy, Spain, Greece,
Turkey, Portugal and Yugoslavia in the 1950’s and 1960’s.
Labor migration over this period was initially considered as temporary by both the
immigration countries and the emigration countries. Individuals were not expected to
settle permanently. The German recruitment policy was based on the assumption that
where (ci) = (ci)=(ci), with  and  being the density and distribution function of the standard
normal, and ci = 0 + RIi. We obtain the estimation equation yi = 0 + RIi + v (ci) + i :
Omission of (ci) results in a biased estimate for . The expectation of the error term when omitting ,
conditional on RIi, is v E((ci)jRIi). Since  decreases in ci, the bias is downward for  < 0 and
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foreign workers would after some years return to their home countries. Still, although
return migration has been quite considerable (see Bohning 1987), a fraction of foreign-
born workers settled more permanently10.
3.3.2 The data and sample
We use for this analysis 12 waves of the German Socio-Economic panel (GSOEP 1984-
1995). The GSOEP is a household-based panel survey, similar to the US Panel Study
of Income Dynamics (PSID) or the British Household Panel Study (BHPS). Initiated
in 1984, the GSOEP oversamples the then resident immigrant population in Germany,
which stems from the migration movement we have described above. In the ﬁrst wave,
about 4500 households with a German-born household head were interviewed, and
about 1500 households with a foreign born household head. The data are unique in
providing repeated information on a boost sample of immigrants over a long period of
time. For our analysis, we use observations for the foreign-born from the over-sample,
as well as from the standard sample.
Each individual in a household and over the age of 16 is interviewed. The house-
hold head provides information about all other individuals in the household and below
the interviewing age. Individuals who leave households and form their own households
are included in the panel.
The GSOEP data provides a rich set of survey questions on remittances and sav-
ings. It distinguishes between remittances for family support, remittances for saving
purposes in the home country, and remittances for other motives. The data on remit-
tances is both qualitative and quantitative. Immigrants are asked whether they remit for
each of the above purposes. They are further asked to quantify the amount of money
they sent back home for each of these purposes during the previous calendar year. In-
formation on remittances is available for the years 1984-1994, with the exception of
the years 1991 and 199311. All monetary variables (including remittances and savings)
are measured at the household level in real amounts, where the reference year is 2002.
A further unique feature of our data is that immigrants provide information in
10The stock of foreign labor in Germany in 2004 was 3.7 million people, of which around 60 per cent
originated from the sending countries considered here (OECD (2006)).
11See Table 3.6 for data availability as well as the Data Construction Appendix 3.6 for a complete
description of the variable construction.3.4. Results 55
each wave of the panel on whether they intend to remain permanently in Germany, or
whether they wish to return home at some stage in the future. We use this information
to construct a binary variable that measures the return plan of the immigrant. As we
discuss above, return plans may change over the migration history, and may deviate
from the ﬁnal return decision; however, remittances (as other behavior) are based on
current plans rather than future realizations.
In addition, we have individual and household characteristics in the host country,
aswellasinformation onfamilymemberswhoarelivingin thecountryoforigin. There
is no information on the use of remittances by the family members in the origin country,
or of other household characteristics or income in the home country.
We provide summary statistics of the variables we use in Table 3.1. We account
for the individual characteristics of the head of household as well as for the number of
adults, children and employed individuals on the household. Entries in Table 3.1 show
that the average age of household heads in our sample is 45 years, and that migrants
resided slightly less than 20 years on average in Germany. More than 83 percent of the
head of households are male, and 77 percent are employed. The average net household
income is 22000 Euros (in 2002 prices). Around 6 percent of household heads are
married with a native partner. With respect to members of the family living abroad,
around 9 percent of heads of households report that their partner lives abroad. The
percentage of head of households that have children under the age of 16 in another
country (different from the host country) is 14 percent. Around 42 percent of all heads
of households report that they grew up in a rural area up to age 15 (”rural childhood”).
Finally, on average, more than half of the household heads in our sample report that
they would wish to return to their home country at some point in the future.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Descriptive evidence
In Table 3.2 we report in the ﬁrst four columns the percentage of households that remit,
the amount of remittances sent per household, overall, conditional on remitting and as a
percentage of household disposable income. About 40 % of households report that they
have sent remittances during the last year. On average households remit around 1500
Euros (in 2002 prices) per year, which corresponds to 8.2 % of disposable household3.4. Results 56
income. Conditional on remitting, the average amount remitted per household is over
3800 Euros. Our data distinguishes between different types of remittances, and overlap
ispossible. Thesearereportedinthelastthreecolumnsofthetable. Thelargestfraction
of remittances is for the purpose of family support: around 28 % of households report
to remit for that reason. Around 6 % of households transfer remittances to be saved in
the home country, while almost 9 % sent remittances for other non-speciﬁed purposes.
The next row distinguishes between households where the head has a permanent
or temporary migration intention. Households with temporary intentions have a 25
percentage points higher probability to remit, and the total unconditional amount (and
the amount as percentage of disposable income) is more than twice the magnitude.
Even after conditioning on remitting a positive amount, temporary migrants remit more
than permanent migrants. The breakdown of remittances in its different purposes in the
last three columns shows also differences for each single category.
The next rows draw distinction between remittances of households with different
characteristics. The difference between remittances for households where the spouse
lives abroad as opposed to single households or households where the spouse lives in
thehostcountryisagainlarge, witharoundtwothirdsofhouseholdsintheﬁrstcategory
sending remittances, compared to only 42 percent in the latter one. In addition, the
average amount remitted for households where the spouse lives abroad is 2988 Euros,
two times larger than for those households whose head is single or where the spouse
lives in the host country. There are also large differences in remittance probabilities
and the overall amounts remitted according to whether children are living abroad or
not. Not surprisingly, the largest differences are in the category ”remittances for family
support”, while ”remittances for savings for later” and ”remittances for other purposes”
are more similar.
The distribution of household remittances is shown in table 3.3. The ﬁrst panel
shows the distribution of the total amount remitted unconditional on remitting a posi-
tive amount, while the second panel shows the distribution conditional on remitting a
positive amount. In both cases, temporary migrants remit a higher amount than per-
manent migrants, both overall and as a percentage of household income. Conditional
on remitting, the amount remitted by the median temporary migrant is over 3300 Eu-
ros (around 15% of the household disposable income). This amount is higher than the3.4. Results 57
amount remitted by the median permanent migrant, 2529 Euros (11% of the household
disposable income).
3.4.2 Remittances and return plans
The descriptive evidence we present in the last section suggests large differences in re-
mittance behavior between households with permanent and temporary migration plans.
Some of these differences may be due to differences in household composition and in-
dividual characteristics of household members; they may also be due to differences in
the family’s residential allocation. We now turn to regression results that hold back-
ground characteristics constant.
We commence with an analysis of whether or not the household sends remittances,
and of which type. In the upper panel of Table 3.4, we report estimation results of
linear probability models.12 We report in the ﬁrst speciﬁcation estimates of an indicator
variable as to whether the head of household considers the migration as permanent or
temporary. In the second speciﬁcation we add information about the whereabouts of
the spouse and the children in the home country. All speciﬁcations include time and
countryoforigindummies, andconditiononage, yearssincemigration(anditssquare),
education, gender, marital status and employment status of the head of household as
well as disposable household income, the number of adults and the number of children
in the household, and whether the individual grew up in a rural area. Standard errors,
reported below the coefﬁcients, are clustered by households. We report the full set of
estimation results in table 3.7.
Results in the ﬁrst pair of columns refer to whether the household sends remit-
tances. Unconditional on the residential location of the family, temporary migration
plans are associated with a 13.4 percentage point higher probability to remit (remem-
ber that only 46 percent of households remit in our sample, so that this estimate cor-
responds to a 29 percent difference); conditional on family location, the estimate only
drops slightly, and suggests a difference of 10 percentage points. The coefﬁcients on
the family location decisions, reported in the second column, suggest a sizeable as-
sociation between remittance propensities and whether spouse or children live abroad.
Households where the spouse is living abroad are associated with a 10 percentage point
12Marginal effects from probit models are almost identical.3.4. Results 58
higher probability to remit; if children live abroad, this probability is a further 14 per-
centage points higher. This suggests that remittance behavior is strongly affected by the
location of the family. But even conditional on family location, temporary migration
plans remain strongly related to remittances: those with temporary plans still have a 10
percentage points higher probability to remit.
The next three pairs of columns report results distinguishing between the three
different purposes of remittances that are reported in our survey: remittances to sup-
port the family, to accumulate savings in the home country, and for other purposes.
Temporary migration plans are strongly related to remittances sent for family support
(although the estimate has nearly halved), even conditional on the location of the im-
mediate family. One reason may be that migrants with temporary migration plans have
commitments towards family members other than the spouse and children, compared
with migrants with permanent intentions. This could be either because a larger fraction
of the extended family is still living abroad (which we do not measure), or because the
temporary nature of their intended migration induces a larger response to expectations
from, and commitments to family and kinship. Not surprisingly, remittances for family
support are strongly associated with the locational choice of the immediate family, as
suggested by the coefﬁcients on the spouse and children variables. On the other hand,
having family members abroad slightly decreases remittances for other purposes as
well as savings in the home country. The coefﬁcient estimates for savings in the home
country and ”other” remittances are smaller, and hardly affected by adding the location
of the immediate family.
Table 3.7 reports results for the full set of parameter estimates. We brieﬂy discuss
here estimates of the income and eduction variables, for the speciﬁcation in the ﬁrst two
columns. The probability of sending remittances increases with disposable household
income, which is compatible with previous empirical ﬁndings13. The magnitude of this
association is quite considerable: an increase in household income by 1 log point is
related to an increase in the probability to remit of about 11 percentage points. Remit-
tances also decrease with educational attainments of the household head, conditional
on household income. This is in line with Faini (2006) who ﬁnds that remittances are
13Lucas & Stark (1985), Hoddinott (1994) and Funkhouser (1995) also report a positive association
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lower for the highly skilled. He suggests as an explanation that skilled immigrants have
longer migration periods, and a higher probability of re-uniting with their families. Our
results show that the coefﬁcient on the education variable is still negative and signiﬁ-
cant even conditional on location of spouse and children and the temporary migration
variable (column 2 in Table 3.7). One explanation is that households where the head is
better educated may enjoy more favorable conditions in the home country, thus reduc-
ing the need for remittances. The better educated may also be less affected by social
pressure to remit.
In the lower panel of Table 3.4, we show results for the same speciﬁcations, where
we use the logarithm of the reported amounts of remittances as the dependent variable.
For zero observations, we set remittances equal to 1.14 Again, we report only the co-
efﬁcients on the temporary measure of migration, and the location of the immediate
family; the full set of results is reported in Table 3.8.
Overall, the qualitative results are similar to those we discuss above. The mag-
nitude of the coefﬁcient estimates are large: total remittances are more than one log
point higher when the migration is intended to be temporary. The coefﬁcient drops to
0.84 when we condition on the location of the family. As before, most of the difference
between temporary and permanent households is due to family support, as columns 2
suggest. However, savings in the home country and ”other” remittances are also sig-
niﬁcantly larger for households with temporary migration plans. While the coefﬁcient
estimate decreases when we condition on family location for family remittances, it in-
creases for the other two purposes.
Alternatively, we have estimated Tobit speciﬁcations; results are very similar. We
have also estimated the regression conditioning on remitting a positive amount, see
Table 3.9.15 Results show that temporary migrants that remit remit an amount 23 %
higher than permanent migrants that remit. In particular, the amount remitted for family
14The dependent variable is thus ln(Z + 1), where Z are total remittances in 2002 Euros.
15The determinants on whether to remit might be different from those determining how much to remit.
Return intentions could inﬂuence the decision on whether to remit or not; while other factors inﬂuence
more the amount remitted (or vice-versa). The results in 3.9 show that intentions to return modify not
only the probability to remit but also the amount remitted overall and for family support. Nevertheless,
other explanatory variables like years of education or employment affect differently the decision to remit
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support is signiﬁcantly higher for temporary migrants. After conditioning on remitting
a positive amount for savings or for other purposes, however, there are no signiﬁcant
differences between temporary and permanent migrants.
3.4.3 Fixed effects, measurement error and reverse causality
The estimates we report in the last section can not be interpreted as causal, as we
discuss in section 3.2.1. The estimated association between the temporary character of
migration and remittances may partly reﬂect that those immigrants who are intending to
return home are also more inclined to remit. Two further problems we discuss are that
the return intention variable is likely to be measured with considerable error, and that
past remittances may affect current return plans. These are likely to lead to a downward
bias in a ﬁxed effects regression. In this section, we attempt to address these issues, by
using the GMM type estimator we explain in section 3.2.1.
In Table 3.5 we report estimation results both for the probability to remit (Panel A)
and for theamount of remittances (Panel B).Speciﬁcations are identical tospeciﬁcation
2 in Table 3.4, and we report as a benchmark (column 1) results from that speciﬁcation.
Columns 2 and 3 report conventional ﬁxed effects (FE) estimates and ﬁxed effects
estimates using forward orthogonal deviations. The results show that estimates for the
two speciﬁcations are very similar, but that conditioning on ﬁxed effects reduces the
temporary migration coefﬁcient considerably. As we discuss above, this could be due
to unobserved factors that affect remittance behavior as well as temporary migration
intentions, but it could also be due to measurement error in the intention variables, or
thefeedbackmechanismsinequation(3). Incolumn4wereportGMMestimates, using
past levels of return plans of other household members as instruments, as described
above. These are considerably larger than the FE estimates, and slightly larger than
the OLS estimates. They suggest a 16.2 percentage point higher probability of sending
remittances for immigrants with temporary migration plans.16 Comparing FE estimates
with GMM estimates suggests that both measurement error and/or feedback leads to a
downward bias in FE estimates.
16The Arellano & Bond (1991) test for second-order autocorrelation on the residuals in differences
does not reject the null of no serial correlation (p-value 0.9), implying that using lags as instruments is
a valid strategy. In addition, the Hansen test for joint validity of the instruments has a p-value of 0.91,
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In the lower panel of the table we assess the magnitude of these effects, using the
logarithm of the total amount of remittances (plus one) as a regressor. The coefﬁcient
estimate on temporary migration drops in the ﬁxed effects speciﬁcation, but is still
signiﬁcant, suggesting that temporary migration plans increase remittances overall by
28 percent. GMM estimates in column 4 are again larger than the OLS estimates,
showing that temporary vs permanent migration plans increase total remittances by 1.3
log points.17
3.5 Discussion and conclusion
To obtain an idea of the magnitude of the relationship between remittance ﬂows and
permanent versus temporary migration plans, we provide some simple estimates based
on the GMM results in Table 3.5. Over the period we consider, the average yearly ﬂow
of remittances sent home by the immigrants in our sample amounts to 1736 Euros per
household, or 504 Euros per individual18. This corresponds to an aggregate of more
than 2 billion Euros in 1995 (equivalent to 0.12% of the German GDP in that year),
for the population of immigrants that are represented in our sample19. Now consider
an increase in permanent migration plans of 10 percentage points (over the ten years
period, permanent migration intentions of households have increased by 30 percentage
points). This change is equivalent to a drop in remittances sent of 15 percent of the
total amount remitted, corresponding to around 300 million Euros, or around 0.018%
of the German GDP in 1995.
The drop in remittances is even more important for receiving countries. To put
this number into perspective, consider Turkey. In 1994, remittance ﬂows corresponded
to 2.1% of the Turkish GDP, much higher than foreign direct investment (0.51%) or
17We have also estimated the model using as instruments past return intentions of both the head of
household and other household members, or the head of household only. Estimates are similar to those
reported.
18We obtain this number by dividing the average remittances per household by the average household
size for our sample during the years 1984-1994. This amount is in line with ofﬁcial aggregate statistics:
total remittance ﬂows in 1995 were 4.12 billion Euros (in 2002 prices) according to Bundesbank (2008),
which corresponds to 574 Euros per immigrant, based on the total immigrant population.
19Immigrants from Turkey, Ex-Yugoslavia, Greece, Italy and Spain, who accounted for 60 percent of
the total immigrant population in Germany in 1995 (OECD (2006).3.5. Discussion and conclusion 62
aid (0.18%) 20. An increase in permanent intentions to stay in Germany of Turkish
immigrants by 10 percentage points corresponds to a decrease in remittance ﬂows of
138 million Euros, using our GMM estimates in Table 3.5. This is equivalent to around
0.28% of Turkish GDP in 1994, an amount equivalent to more than half of foreign
direct investment received by Turkey in 1994 and much higher than the total amount
of aid received. Although these are rough calculations, they highlight the magnitude of
the effects of temporary vs permanent migration on remittance behaviour.
Ourresultsemphasizetheimportanceoftheparticularformofmigrationforimmi-
grant behavior. They suggest that migration policies that encourage temporary migra-
tion are likely to lead to higher remittance ﬂows than migration policies that encourage
permanentsettlement. Thus, ouranalysissuggeststhatremittancesneedtobediscussed
in conjunction with the particular form of migration.
20OECD (2005), WorldBank (2006).3.6. Data Construction Appendix 63
3.6 Data Construction Appendix
We use data from the ﬁrst 12 waves of the German Socio-Economic Panel (years 1984-
1995). Our sample consists of migrant households whose head was born in Turkey,
Greece, Yugoslavia, Italy or Spain.
Individuals are asked in each wave of the panel whether they intend to remain
permanently in Germany, or whether they wish to return home at some stage in the
future. We construct a binary variable that equals 1 if the head of household plans to
return in the future.
Household income corresponds to the net monthly income of the household, in
2002 Euros and transformed to the yearly level. The exact wording of the question
is ”If everything is taken together: how high is the total monthly income of all the
household members at present? Please give the monthly net amount, the amount after
the deduction of tax and national insurance contributions. Regular payments such as
rent subsidy, child beneﬁt, government grants, subsistence allowances, etc., should be
included. If not known exactly, please estimate the monthly amount.”
Individuals declare each year the amount of remittances sent in the previous year
(except for the surveys in 1992 and 1994). The wording of the question is ”(Last year)
did you personally send or take money to your homeland?”. In case of an afﬁrmative
answer, individuals are asked for the overall amount and the purpose: ”And how is this
amount distributed between support for your family, savings for later and other”. ”Sav-
ings” correspond to the amount of savings in the home country. ”Other” corresponds
to any other purpose. We aggregate these amounts to the household level and lag them
for one year to match them time-wise with the rest of observed variables.Sex 
Age 
Age At Arrival 
Years Since Migration 
Number Years Education 
Household Income
Number Children in Household
Number Adults in Household
Number Employed Individuals in Household
Employed  
Non Single 
Native Partner 
Spouse Abroad  
Children Abroad  
Rural Childhood  
Temporary  
0.769
2.203 1.031
Table 1 : Summary Statistics - 1984-1994
1.395 0.903
22030 12922
0.853 1.093
19.026 6.270
9.588 1.925
45.210 12.210
25.178 8.587
Mean Std. Dev.
0.834 0.371
0.877
0.058
0.093
0.137
Note: Calculations based on GSOEP data, 1984-1990, 1992, 1994. Individual information 
corresponds to the head of household. Household Income in 2002 Euros. 
0.418
0.517
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics - 1984-1994
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Percent 
Households 
Remitting
 Total 
Amount         
(in 2002 
Euros)
Total 
Amount 
Conditional 
on 
Remitting
Total Amount 
As 
Percentage 
of HH 
Disposable 
Income
Percent 
Households 
Remitting to 
Family  
  Percent 
Households 
Remitting for 
Savings 
Percent 
Households 
Remitting for 
Other 
Purposes
Total Migrant 39.55% 1,505 3,806 7.44% 28.48% 5.79% 8.84%
Permanent    25.97% 824 3,173 4.04% 18.84% 2.76% 5.80%
Temporary    51.09% 2,056 4,024 9.87% 37.05% 8.26% 11.65%
  
No Spouse Abroad   41.59% 1,501 3,610 6.68% 29.55% 6.34% 9.91%
Spouse Abroad    66.23% 2,988 4,512 19.09% 55% 5.37% 5.72%
  
No Children Abroad   41.75% 1,455 3,486 6.59% 29.36% 6.44% 9.97%
Children Abroad  69.66% 3,281 4,710 18.32% 57.87% 7.23% 9.07%
Note: Calculations based on GSOEP data (1984-1990,1992,1994), on household level, using household weights.
Information on temporary intention, spouse and children abroad corresponds to the head of household. "No Spouse
Abroad" includes single heads of household. "No children abroad" includes heads of household with children in the host
country and without children. 
Table 2: Remittances by Household Characteristics
Table 3.2: Remittances by Household Characteristics
65p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
 Total Amount Remitted unconditional on remitting
All
Euros 0 0 0 1897 4904
As percentage of HH Income 0% 0% 0% 8% 25%
Permanent
Euros 0 0 0 0 3046
As percentage of HH Income 0% 0% 0% 0% 14%
Temporary
Euros 0 0 0 3161 6497
As percentage of HH Income 0% 0% 0% 14% 31%
 Total Amount Remitted conditional on remitting
All
Euros 649 1383 3042 5408 8296
As percentage of HH Income 3% 7% 13% 26% 44%
Permanent
Euros 442 1298 2529 4220 7790
As percentage of HH Income 2% 6% 11% 20% 38%
Temporary
Euros 677 1658 3337 5531 8798
As percentage of HH Income 3% 7% 15% 28% 46%
Note: Calculations based on GSOEP data (1984-1990,1992,1994), on household level, 
using household weights. Information on temporary intention corresponds to the head 
of household. 
Table 3.3: Distribution of Household Remittances
66Temporary 0.134** 0.096** 0.101** 0.057** 0.029** 0.030** 0.033** 0.043**
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.008) (0.008) (0.013) (0.013)
Spouse Abroad 0.097* 0.1 -0.026 -0.022
(0.046) (0.054) (0.017) (0.024)
Children Abroad 0.141** 0.177** 0 -0.005
(0.031) (0.031) (0.014) (0.016)
R-squared 0.162 0.172 0.122 0.141 0.033 0.034 0.032 0.034
Temporary 1.114** 0.837** 0.819** 0.483** 0.222** 0.235** 0.250* 0.337**
(0.163) (0.162) (0.160) (0.155) (0.062) (0.064) (0.098) (0.100)
Spouse Abroad 0.899* 0.925* -0.219 -0.204
(0.376) (0.410) (0.132) (0.170)
Children Abroad 1.256** 1.565** -0.008 -0.051
(0.257) (0.251) (0.109) (0.119)
R-squared 0.177 0.193 0.135 0.162 0.033 0.034 0.033 0.036
Observations 8,917 7,709 8,917 7,709 8,917 7,709 8,917 7,709
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 3: Probability to Remit and Amount Remitted - OLS
Note: GSOEP data (1984-1990,1992,1994). Household level, weighted regression using household
weights. All specifications include time and country dummies and condition on age, years since
migration (and its square), education, gender, marital status, childhood in a rural area in the home
country and employment status of the head of household as well as household income, employment
status other members of the household, number of adults and children in the host country household.
Standard errors are clustered by household.
Household Sent Remittances (=1 Yes, =0 No)
Logarithm  (Amount Remitted + 1)
Total Family Support Savings for Later Other Purposes
Table 3.4: Probability to Remit and Amount Remitted - OLS
67Household Sent Remittances  (=1 Yes, =0 No)
OLS FE
FE Orthog 
Deviations GMM 
(1) (2) (3) (6)
Temporary 0.096** 0.032* 0.034** 0.162* 
a
(0.020) (0.015) (0.0145) (0.069)
Logarithm (Amount Remitted+1)
Temporary 0.837** 0.244* 0.253** 1.396** 
b
(0.162) (0.121) (0.115) (0.542)
Observations 7,709 7,984 6,574 6,473
Number of Never Changing Person ID 1,411 1,173 1,170
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 4: Probability to Remit and Amount Remitted - Fixed Effects and GMM
Note: GSOEP data (1984-1990,1992,1994). Household level, using household
weights. All specifications include time dummies and condition on marital status and
employment status of the head of the household, as well as household income,
employment status of the rest of the members of the household, number of adults
and children in the host country household and indicator variables for spouse and
children in the home country. OLS specification includes in addition country dummies,
age, years since migration (and its square), education, gender and childhood in a
rural area in the home country. Standard errors are clustered by household.
Instrumental variables used in GMM: lags in average intention to return (t-1, …, 1) of
other household members.  
(a) AR(1) Test: z=-10.42  P-Value=0   AR(2) Test: z=-0112  P-Value=0.911                                            
Hansen Test =31.88  P-Value=0.619
(b) AR(1) Test: z=-10.469  P-Value=0  AR(2) Test: z=-0.14  P-Value=0.888                                     
Hansen Test =32.34  P-Value=0.597
Table 3.5: Probability to Remit and Amount Remitted - Fixed Effects and GMM
68Return Intention Intention to Return to the Home Country
Total Remittances Total Amount sent to Home Country 1984-1990,1992,1994
Table A1: GSOEP Data Availability
Variable Name Description Availability
Family Remittances Amount sent to Support the Family 1984-1990,1992,1994
Savings at Home Country Amount Saved in the Home Country 1984-1990,1992,1994
Remittances for other purposes Amount sent for other purposes 1984-1990,1992,1994
Savings at Host Country Amount Saved in the Host Country  1992-2003
Annual Net Household Income  1984-2003
 1984-2003
Children Abroad Under Aged Children in the Home Country   1984-1997
Spouse Abroad Spouse in the Home Country   1984-1997
Household Income
Note: German Socio Economic Panel (GSOEP) data. 
Number of Adults Number Adults Host Country Household  1984-2003
Number of Children Number Children Host Country Household  1984-2003
Table 3.6: GSOEP Data Availability
69Age/10 0.028* -0.001 0.032* 0.009 0.006 0.008 -0.004 -0.005
(0.014) (0.017) (0.013) (0.017) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009)
Years Since Migration/10 0.165* 0.165 0.116 0.073 0.024 0.008 0.007 0.056
(0.074) (0.086) (0.064) (0.083) (0.024) (0.033) (0.041) (0.039)
YSM-Squared/100 -0.064** -0.049* -0.050** -0.032 -0.009 -0.004 -0.005 -0.012
(0.017) (0.021) (0.015) (0.021) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010)
Log HH Income 0.109** 0.106** 0.087** 0.077** 0.021** 0.029** 0.018 0.018
(0.024) (0.027) (0.020) (0.023) (0.008) (0.010) (0.013) (0.015)
Number Adults HH Host -0.049** -0.034* -0.051** -0.029 -0.008 -0.01 0.016 0.011
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.011)
Number Children HH Host -0.024* -0.017 -0.031** -0.019 0.002 0.000 -0.001 -0.004
(0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Employment Head HH 0.130** 0.121** 0.123** 0.116** 0.004 0.011 -0.005 -0.012
(0.031) (0.034) (0.031) (0.034) (0.011) (0.012) (0.016) (0.017)
Number Employed HH 0.042** 0.044** 0.019 0.021 0.021** 0.018* 0.025* 0.029**
(0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010)
Number Years Education -0.017* -0.019** -0.013 -0.014* -0.004 -0.005* 0.001 -0.002
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Male  Head HH 0.124** 0.164** 0.082* 0.134** 0.028** 0.031* 0.017 0.021
(0.045) (0.054) (0.041) (0.049) (0.009) (0.013) (0.018) (0.025)
Non Single Head HH 0.05 -0.019 0.055 -0.035 0.007 0.012 0 0.004
(0.046) (0.054) (0.044) (0.051) (0.012) (0.018) (0.020) (0.026)
Native Partner -0.110* -0.091 -0.051 -0.034 -0.047** -0.047** -0.072** -0.064**
(0.054) (0.064) (0.046) (0.055) (0.010) (0.012) (0.016) (0.019)
Temporary 0.134** 0.096** 0.101** 0.057** 0.029** 0.030** 0.033** 0.043**
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.008) (0.008) (0.013) (0.013)
Spouse Abroad 0.097* 0.1 -0.026 -0.022
(0.046) (0.054) (0.017) (0.024)
Children Abroad 0.141** 0.177** 0.000 -0.005
(0.031) (0.031) (0.014) (0.016)
Rural Childhood 0.066* 0.041 0.000 0.008
(0.027) (0.026) (0.010) (0.013)
Observations 8,917 7,709 8,917 7,709 8,917 7,709 8,917 7,709
Pseudo R-sq 0.162 0.172 0.122 0.141 0.033 0.034 0.032 0.034
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Note: Dependent variable: Household sent remittances (=1 Yes, =0 No). GSOEP data (1984-
1990,1992,1994). Weighted regression using household weights. All specifications include time and
country dummies.   Standard errors are clustered by household. 
Table A2: Probability to Remit  - Full Set of Results
Total Family Support Savings for Later Other Purposes
Table 3.7: Probability to Remit - Full Set of Results
70Age/10 0.269* 0.034 0.284** 0.104 0.045 0.058 -0.033 -0.032
(0.113) (0.139) (0.101) (0.134) (0.057) (0.062) (0.053) (0.067)
Years Since Migration/10 1.197* 1.26 0.808 0.48 0.172 0.049 0.013 0.385
(0.605) (0.684) (0.508) (0.642) (0.198) (0.270) (0.319) (0.297)
YSM-Squared/100 -0.498** -0.390* -0.379** -0.232 -0.066 -0.025 -0.034 -0.083
(0.138) (0.165) (0.114) (0.156) (0.049) (0.068) (0.073) (0.080)
Log HH Income 0.981** 0.996** 0.749** 0.694** 0.192** 0.256** 0.153 0.16
(0.205) (0.239) (0.159) (0.185) (0.069) (0.084) (0.104) (0.119)
Number Adults HH Host -0.503** -0.358** -0.492** -0.300** -0.071 -0.09 0.116 0.079
(0.111) (0.114) (0.104) (0.116) (0.046) (0.047) (0.069) (0.081)
Number Children HH Host -0.246** -0.180* -0.303** -0.190* 0.019 -0.004 -0.002 -0.022
(0.076) (0.083) (0.072) (0.082) (0.036) (0.040) (0.040) (0.046)
Employment Head HH 1.012** 0.940** 0.954** 0.894** 0.021 0.068 -0.045 -0.091
(0.237) (0.256) (0.232) (0.255) (0.083) (0.092) (0.123) (0.133)
Number Employed HH 0.393** 0.397** 0.172 0.183 0.171** 0.145* 0.201* 0.231**
(0.123) (0.128) (0.114) (0.121) (0.057) (0.060) (0.078) (0.080)
Number Years Education -0.119* -0.123* -0.084 -0.087 -0.031 -0.041* 0.004 -0.01
(0.057) (0.058) (0.055) (0.053) (0.019) (0.020) (0.022) (0.024)
Male  Head HH 1.118** 1.460** 0.717* 1.135** 0.233** 0.253* 0.174 0.193
(0.348) (0.405) (0.316) (0.367) (0.072) (0.103) (0.127) (0.174)
Non Single Head HH 0.557 -0.042 0.598 -0.161 0.048 0.096 -0.029 0.013
(0.351) (0.407) (0.331) (0.382) (0.097) (0.144) (0.154) (0.199)
Native Partner -1.069** -0.921* -0.536 -0.394 -0.376** -0.376** -0.570** -0.509**
(0.367) (0.431) (0.315) (0.375) (0.078) (0.093) (0.116) (0.137)
Temporary 1.114** 0.837** 0.819** 0.483** 0.222** 0.235** 0.250* 0.337**
(0.163) (0.162) (0.160) (0.155) (0.062) (0.064) (0.098) (0.100)
Spouse Abroad 0.899* 0.925* -0.219 -0.204
(0.376) (0.410) (0.132) (0.170)
Children Abroad 1.256** 1.565** -0.008 -0.051
(0.257) (0.251) (0.109) (0.119)
Rural Childhood 0.585** 0.351 -0.002 0.084
(0.211) (0.204) (0.084) (0.103)
Observations 8,917 7,709 8,917 7,709 8,917 7,709 8,917 7,709
Pseudo R-sq 0.177 0.193 0.135 0.162 0.033 0.034 0.033 0.036
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Note: Dependent variable: Logarithm (Amount Remitted+1). GSOEP data (1984-1990,1992,1994).
Weighted regression using household weights. All specifications include time and country dummies.
Standard errors are clustered by household.  
Table A3 Amount Remitted - Full Set of Results
Total Family Support Savings for Later Other Purposes
Table 3.8: Amount Remitted - Full Set of Results
71m1 m2 m3 m4 m5 m6 m7 m8
Age/10 0.113* 0.108 0.144* 0.120 0.050 -0.058 0.012 0.023
(0.053) (0.056) (0.069) (0.069) (0.084) (0.091) (0.083) (0.090)
Years Since Migration/10 -0.124 0.000 -0.183 -0.201 -0.665 -0.484 -0.525 -0.678
(0.253) (0.291) (0.295) (0.330) (0.449) (0.518) (0.401) (0.440)
YSM-Squared/100 -0.014 -0.018 0.014 0.039 0.168 0.148 0.110 0.182
(0.066) (0.074) (0.077) (0.085) (0.126) (0.140) (0.109) (0.116)
Log HH Income 0.482** 0.531** 0.554** 0.619** 0.608** 0.575** 0.222 0.222
(0.141) (0.162) (0.112) (0.116) (0.177) (0.198) (0.177) (0.186)
Number Adults HH Host -0.245** -0.198** -0.301** -0.232** -0.139 -0.161 -0.039 -0.047
(0.045) (0.047) (0.048) (0.049) (0.095) (0.096) (0.064) (0.069)
Number Children HH Host -0.119** -0.076* -0.164** -0.108** -0.025 -0.049 0.053 0.051
(0.029) (0.030) (0.032) (0.035) (0.051) (0.056) (0.046) (0.048)
Employment Head HH 0.186 0.196 0.285* 0.301* -0.221 -0.359 0.121 0.213
(0.113) (0.117) (0.141) (0.146) (0.234) (0.253) (0.175) (0.181)
Number Employed HH 0.109 0.100 0.031 0.014 -0.086 -0.047 0.071 0.045
(0.057) (0.060) (0.062) (0.064) (0.107) (0.112) (0.086) (0.093)
Number Years Education 0.032 0.040* 0.032 0.043 0.063 0.048 0.012 0.025
(0.018) (0.018) (0.023) (0.024) (0.033) (0.034) (0.025) (0.028)
Male  Head HH 0.569** 0.668** 0.427** 0.534** 0.695** 0.694** 0.700* 0.439
(0.140) (0.181) (0.138) (0.178) (0.210) (0.240) (0.294) (0.354)
Non Single Head HH 0.396** 0.121 0.462** 0.143 0.025 0.035 -0.304 -0.306
(0.123) (0.140) (0.149) (0.160) (0.172) (0.219) (0.213) (0.262)
Native Partner -0.832** -0.708** -0.695** -0.569** 0.165 0.117 -0.571 -0.688
(0.136) (0.149) (0.130) (0.142) (0.558) (0.575) (0.353) (0.359)
Temporary 0.177** 0.234** 0.174* 0.184* -0.099 -0.125 0.039 0.169
(0.063) (0.064) (0.074) (0.073) (0.145) (0.170) (0.121) (0.131)
Spouse Abroad 0.239* 0.266** -0.018 -0.386
(0.113) (0.096) (0.224) (0.326)
Children Abroad 0.225** 0.371** -0.148 -0.087
(0.064) (0.074) (0.163) (0.168)
Rural Childhood 0.127 0.100 -0.040 0.220*
(0.067) (0.077) (0.128) (0.107)
Number Observations 3,812 3,501 2,623 2,419 700 639 965 870
R-Squared 0.177 0.200 0.228 0.261 0.150 0.139 0.083 0.108
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Note: Dependent variable: Logarithm (Amount Remitted+1) conditional on remitting a positive amount
in each remittance category. GSOEP data (1984-1990,1992,1994). Weighted regression using
household weights. All specifications include time and country dummies. Standard errors are
clustered by household.  
Total Family Support Savings for Later Other Purposes
Table 3.9: Amount Remitted Conditional on Remitting - Full Set of Results
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Savings, Asset Holdings, and
Temporary Migration.
This chapter has been co-authored with Christian Dustmann and has been published in Annales
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4.1 Introduction
The economic performance of immigrants is important for assessment of the welfare
implications of immigration. Not surprisingly therefore, a large number of papers in-
vestigates the (relative) earnings position of immigrants over the migration cycle, for
different countries, and using both cross-section and time-series data (from the early
works of Chiswick (1978) and Borjas (1985) to Dustmann (1993), Friedberg (1993),
Borjas (1995), Barth et al. (2004), Bratsberg et al. (2006) and Lubotsky (2007) among
others). An area that has received less attention, but is perhaps equally important for
assessing the economic position of immigrants in the receiving country, is their asset
accumulation and savings.
Like earnings, assets and savings are likely to be affected by plans about a future
return. Return intentions in the past may have affected past earnings as well as past
expenditures, and therefore the magnitude of current asset holdings and past and cur-
rent savings. Return intentions can affect as well the amount of precautionary savings
migrants held. Dustmann (1995) and Dustmann (1997) have shown that, under certain
conditions, migrants might hold a greater amount of precautionary savings if they face
a greater income risk in the host country.1
Furthermore, pastandcurrentreturnintentionsmaydeterminewhereassetsandsavings
are held. For instance, when considering housing and other investments, these may be
undertaken in the country of origin if migrations are intended as temporary rather than
permanent.2
A number of papers analyse the wealth gap between immigrants and natives. Most
of these report a persistent gap, even conditional on observable characteristics3. How-
ever, most measures of immigrant wealth do not consider immigrants’ wealth in the
home- and host country separately. Hence, an analysis that considers wealth accumu-
1Although they could also hold a lower amount of precautionary savings if the labour markets of both
home and host countries are correlated, as they could diversify risk between the two.
2See Woodruff & Zenteno (2007) and Yang (2006) for evidence on the creation of enterprises of
immigrants in their home countries while abroad. Dustmann & Kirchkamp (2002) and Mesnard (2004)
provide evidence of immigrants undertaking entrepreneurial activities after return.
3See for example Blau & Graham (1990), Coulson (1999), Borjas (2002), Amuedo-Dorantes & Pozo
(2002), Painter et al. (2003), Osili & Paulson (2004), Cobb-Clark & Hildebrand (2006), Sinning (2007,
2009) or Bauer et al. (2011).4.1. Introduction 75
lation without differentiating between locations may only give an incomplete picture
of asset holdings and savings. In addition, most of these studies do not allow either for
heterogeneity across immigrants due to differences in past and current return plans.4
In this paper, we provide an analysis of immigrant savings and asset holdings in
relation to past and current return plans. We also consider the possibility that savings
and assets are held not only in the host country, but also in the country of origin. Our
analysis is based on a unique data source that provides information on asset holdings,
its composition and location, as well as immigrants’ return plans. We describe immi-
grants’ asset accumulation and savings, and how it relates to return intentions, as well
as individual and household characteristics. The paper makes two contributions. First,
it provides analysis of the relationship between return plans, on the one hand, and sav-
ings and asset holdings on the other. Second, it illustrates the importance of considering
migrants’ asset holdings not only in the host- but also the home country.
Our results show that the overall level of savings and asset accumulation of im-
migrants would be severely underestimated if the home country wealth is not taken
into consideration. In addition, they show how immigrants’ return plans are related
to wealth accumulation. The total value of assets held does not differ signiﬁcantly
between immigrant households with temporary intentions and those with permanent
ones. However, the distribution of these assets between host- and home country loca-
tion does differ. Migrants who plan to return do allocate a higher proportion of their
savings, assets and property in their home country.
The structure of the paper is as follows: in the next section we discuss conceptual
considerations, in section 4.3 we present our data and explain the descriptive evidence,
in section 4.4 we show our results and ﬁnally in section 4.5 we conclude and discuss
potential implications.
4An exception is Bauer & Sinning (2011), who found that savings behaviour of migrants is related
to their return plans. The analysis considers different measures of migrant savings, assuming either that
no remittances are saved or that all remittances are saved, without differentiating between remittance
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4.2 Conceptual considerations and estimation
4.2.1 A Simple Model
We start with a simple model that focuses on the way temporary vs permanent mi-
grations relate to savings behavior. A more detailed analysis of the interplay between
savings and return (both exogenous and optimally chosen) can be found in Dustmann
(1995).
As in Galor & Stark (1990), suppose that the lifetime of the immigrant can be
divided into 2 sub-periods: period 1 is the time to be spent in the host country, and
period 2 is the time to be spent in the home country after a possible return. Return
in period 2 takes place with probability p. In the case that p = 0, the migration is
permanent. Consider the following inter-temporal utility function:
U = u
1(c
1) + p u
2(c
E2) + (1   p)u
2(c
I2): (4.1)
In equation (4.1), u1 is the sub-utility in period 1 in the host country and  u2 and
u2 are the sub-utilities in period 2 in the home and in the host country respectively,
which we assume as being strictly concave in consumption. Further, c1, cI2 and cE2 are
ﬁrst and second period consumption in immigration (index I) and emigration (index E)
countries respectively. The parameter p 2 [0;1] is the probability the migrant attaches
to a possible return to the home country in the second period.
Consumption in the second period in the case of a return may induce more util-
ity than consumption in the host country, due to complementarities through climate,
friends, etc. This is captured by the parameter . If  > 1, the migrant has a higher
level of utility and a higher marginal utility if he/she consumes in the home country.
The budget constraint for the ﬁrst period is given by w1 = c1 + s. The budget
constraint for the second period is wI2 + s = cI2 in the case of a permanent migration
and wE2+rs = cE2 in the case of a return. Earnings in period 1 are denoted by w1, and
in period 2 by wE2 and wI2 in home and host countries respectively. The purchasing
power of the host country currency in the home country is given by r. If r > 1, the
purchasing power of the host country currency is higher in the migrant’s home country.5
5For simplicity we have assumed that interest rates are equal in the two countries; if interest rates
were different between home and host country then this would be an additional source of differential4.2. Conceptual considerations and estimation 77
The choice variable in period 1 is savings s. Given the budget constraint, it ﬁxes
consumption in the ﬁrst period (c1) and in the second period (cE2, cI2). The ﬁrst order
condition is given by:
d
ds
: u
1
1 = p u
2
1 r + (1   p)u
2
1 (4.2)
where the subscript 1 denotes the ﬁrst derivative.
Equation (4.2) determines the optimal level of savings. Savings will be set such
that the marginal cost in terms of forgone utility in period 1 is equalized to the expected
marginal return in period 2. If p = 0 (the migration is permanent), savings will equalize
the marginal utility of consumption in the two periods in the host country. If p 2 (0;1),
a change in p leads to a change in savings according to the following relationship:
ds
dp
=
 [r u2
1(wE + rs)   u2
1(wI + s)]
u1
11 + p r2 u2
11 + (1   p)u2
11
: (4.3)
The expression in the denominator is always negative. Assume ﬁrst that  = 1
and r = 1: Preferences for consumption are the same in the two countries, as is the
purchasing power of the host country currency. In that case, savings will be increasing
in p as long as wE < wI, due to strict concavity of the utility function. The intuition is
that an increase in savings increases the marginal utility of consumption by more in the
home country, due to lower wages; thus, an increase in the return probability p leads
to higher savings. Now suppose that  > 1: Individuals prefer to consume at home
rather than abroad. This will reinforce the effect of an increase in the return probability
on savings. Finally, suppose that the purchasing power of the host country currency is
higher at home so that r > 1. In this case, the overall effect on savings is ambiguous,
as it is now unclear whether an increase in savings increases the marginal utility of
consumption more in the home- or the host country. Sufﬁcient for the effect of an
increase in p on savings to be positive is that the wage differential between home- and
host country is larger than the gain obtained on savings through the purchasing power
differential wI   wE > (r   1)s. Thus, according to this simple model, savings may
be positively or (if purchasing power differentials are important) negatively affected by
an increase in the return probability, or the two effects may compensate each other.
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Our simple model has nothing to say however about where savings are held. It
may well be that immigrants who assign a high probability to a return are more likely
to transfer some of their savings to the home country. If that is the case, an empirical
analysis of immigrants’ savings may lead to an underestimate when only considering
savings in the host economy.
Now consider asset holdings, like housing assets or long-term investments. If
these are proportional to the level of past savings, then our simple life-cycle model
should suggest that in general, the relationship to the temporariness of a migration
is ambiguous. The model does not explain where these assets are held. However, it
is not unlikely that immigrants who assign a high probability to a later return have a
preference for accumulation in the home country. This is particularly the case for assets
that have the character of durable consumption goods, and that can not be moved from
one place to another, like housing assets.
4.2.2 Empirical Implementation
In the empirical analysis we regress the various outcome variables on a vector of indi-
vidual speciﬁc characteristics, country of origin dummies, and a measure for the prob-
ability to return. The generic regression has the form
Yi = 1 + X
0
i2 +  Ti + ui (4.4)
where Yi is the respective outcome, Xi is a vector of background characteristics,
ui is an error term, and Ti is a measure for the temporariness of a migration. As we
explain below, in our data we observe for each year an indicator question whether or not
the individual would like to return home at some point in the future. These intentions
may change over time, and accordingly affect the savings- and asset holding decision.
In our analysis, we will use the average intention to return, computed from information
over the last ﬁve years, as a measure of temporariness when analyzing asset holdings,
and the current intention to return when analyzing current savings.
We would like to emphasize that we do not interpret our estimates as causal. While
in our simple model, the return probability is exogenously given, immigrants may well
choose whether they wish to return, and this choice may not be exogenous to savings-
or asset accumulation decisions. Further, our measure for the temporariness of a mi-4.3. Background and data 79
gration may well be measured with error, which would bias the coefﬁcient estimate
towards zero. We believe however that the associations between the temporariness of
a migration on the one hand, and savings- and asset accumulation behavior, as well as
the choice of where these are to be held, conditional on background characteristics, are
interesting and important.6 The overall comparison in savings and asset accumulation
between immigrants and natives is of course not affected by possible endogeneity of
return migrations.
4.3 Background and data
4.3.1 Background
The West-German economy experienced a strong upward swing after 1955, accompa-
nied by a sharp fall in the unemployment rate. Between 1955 and 1960, the unemploy-
ment rate fell from 5.6 % to 1.3 % (Arbeitslosigkeit im Zeitverlauf (2009)). At the same
time, the percentage of foreign born workers from Southern European countries and
Turkey employed in West Germany increased from 0.6 percent in 1957 to 5.3 percent
in 1965, to 11.2 percent in 1973 (see Blitz (1977)). Immigration was regulated by bi-
lateral recruitment agreements. Such agreements were set up with Italy, Spain, Greece,
Turkey, Portugal and Yugoslavia in the 1950’s and 1960’s. After 1973, recruitment of
foreign labour stopped. Nevertheless, immigration from these countries continued, due
to family reuniﬁcation (see Dustmann (1996) for more details). The immigrant popula-
tion we study in this paper stems from that migration movement. Labor migration over
this period was initially considered as temporary by both the immigration countries and
the emigration countries. Still, although return migration has been quite considerable
(see Bohning (1987)), a large fraction of foreign born workers settled permanently7.
6In Dustmann & Mestres (2010a) where we analyze remittances and their relationship to temporary
migration decisions, we address these problems by combining a ﬁxed effects estimator with an IV strat-
egy. In that paper, we have access to repeated information for remittances for a large number of time
periods. We ﬁnd that the IV-ﬁxed effects estimates are close to the original OLS estimates, due to the
downward bias through measurement error being of similar size than the upward bias induced through
unobservable heterogeneity. Assets and savings - which we analyze in this paper - are only observed
once or twice over the course of the panel.
7The stock of foreign labor in Germany in 2004 was 3.7 million people, of which around 60 per cent
originated from the sending countries considered here (table B.1.5, citetOECD-MigrOutlook-2006).4.3. Background and data 80
4.3.2 Data and Sample
The data set we use is the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). The GSOEP is
a household-based panel survey, similar to the US Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID) or the British Household Panel Study (BHPS). Initiated in 1984, the GSOEP
oversamples the then-resident immigrant population in Germany, which stems from the
migrationmovementwehavedescribedabove. Intheﬁrstwave, about4500households
with a German born household head were interviewed, and about 1500 households with
a foreign born household head. The data are unique in providing repeated information
on a boost sample of immigrants over a long period of time. For our analysis, we use
observations for the foreign born from the over-sample, as well as observations for the
native born from the standard sample.
Each individual in a household and over the age of 16 is interviewed. The house-
hold head provides information about all other individuals in the household and below
the interviewing age. Individuals who leave households and form their own households
are included in the panel.
The GSOEP data provides information on asset holdings in both the home- and
host country only for the year 1988. For that year only, there is detailed information on
the type of asset holdings, their values and - importantly - whether the asset is held in
the host- or source country.8 Asset holdings refer to the total amount of asset holdings
of the household (including cash, savings, home ownership, etc.) net of ﬁnancial obli-
gations in each location separately. Home ownership refers to all houses, apartments or
any other property of the household at market prices in both home and host countries.
Savings are declared in both home- and host country locations only for the years
1992 and 19949. Savings in the host country correspond to the net monthly savings of
the household transformed to a yearly level. Savings in the home country correspond
to the individual yearly amount remitted for saving purposes in the home country and
transformed to household level. We construct the total amount of household savings
as the sum of the yearly amounts the household saved in both locations. We will use
8See the Appendix for a more detailed description of the data construction.
9The amount of savings in Germany is declared from 1992 onwards, while the amount saved in
the home country is declared only on the years 1984-1990,1992 and 1994. See the data construction
appendix for further details.4.4. Results 81
those two years where we observe savings in both locations (1992 and 1994) to study
the allocation of savings. All monetary variables are at the household level in real
amounts, where the reference year is 2002.
A further unique feature of our data is that immigrants provide information in each
wave of the panel whether they intend to remain permanently in Germany, or whether
they wish to return home at some stage in the future. We use this information to differ-
entiate between those who do and those who do not plan to return to the home country.
If economic decisions are involved, it is likely that these are based on intentions of this
sort, rather than on possible realizations at a later stage.
In addition, we observe individual and household characteristics in the host coun-
try, as well as information on family members who are living in the country of origin.
4.4 Results
4.4.1 Descriptive Evidence
Individual Characteristics: As we mention above, we measure savings and asset accu-
mulation on the level of the household. When we refer to characteristics of individuals
within households, we typically refer to the head of household. Entries in Table 1
show that the average age of household heads in our sample is 45 years, and that mi-
grants resided slightly less than 22 years on average in Germany. Almost 90 percent
of the head of households are male, and 78 percent are employed. The yearly average
net household income is around 25,000 Euros (in 2002 prices). Around 93 percent of
household heads are not single; however, only 7 percent have native partners. Almost
40 percent of all heads of households report that they grew up in a rural area. The last
variable measures the return intention of the household head. On average, 51 percent of
the household heads in our sample report that they would wish to return to their home
country at some point in the future.
Savings: We study the yearly amount of savings for the years 1992 and 1994. For
immigrants, savingsrefertothetotalamountsavedaswellastheamountssavedinhost-
and home countries. As a reference, we also report savings for native born individuals.
Here savings refer to the total amount saved. In the upper panel of Table 2, we describe
savings for all immigrants in the ﬁrst pair of columns; in next two pairs of columns
we distinguish between immigrants with temporary and permanent return plans. In the4.4. Results 82
following pair of columns we report the mean difference between immigrant groups
and its t-statistic. The information on return plans refers to the head of household.10
About 48 percent of all immigrant households report to save in the host country.
The average amount saved is 2046 Euros (not conditional on saving a positive amount),
which corresponds to 7.4 percent of overall household income. Immigrants with per-
manent migration plans are less likely to save in the host country than than those with
temporary plans, and they save a lower amount. The difference in savings in the host
country corresponds to one percent of the household income. The next row shows the
savings in the home country. The proportion of immigrants with temporary intentions
who save is more than 4 percentage points higher than that of immigrants with per-
manent intentions, with the amount saved being higher as well. Both differences are
signiﬁcantly different statistically. Finally, the last three rows report the total amount of
yearly savings. As a point of reference, we report the total amount of savings of natives
in the last two columns. One in two of all immigrants households report to save, as
compared to 65 percent of native households. The total average amount of savings is
equal to 2199 Euros (which corresponds to 8.1% of immigrants’ household income, as
compared to 10% for natives), which is lower than the average savings for natives both
in absolute value and relative to their household incomes.11
When we distinguish between immigrants with permanent and temporary inten-
tions, there is a clear difference between the two groups, with those with temporary
intentions saving more in absolute terms, as well as in percentage of their household
income.
Home Ownership and Assets: A set of questions asking about asset holdings was
included in the survey in 1988. For immigrants, questions relate to property and asset
holdings, both in Germany and in the home country. For natives, questions relate to to-
tal property and asset holdings. We report descriptives in the second (home ownership)
and third (assets) panels of Table 2. As before, the ﬁrst two columns report averages
for all immigrants, while the next columns distinguish between immigrants with per-
10We use all observations for which both savings or asset information and return plans are reported.
11The household savings ratio in our data is in line with aggregate data from the German Central
Bank’s (Bundesbank) Financial Accounts, where household savings correspond on average to 12% of
household disposable income for years 1992 and 1994 (Bundesbank, 2008).4.4. Results 83
manent and temporary migration plans respectively. We include the natives’ average as
reference in the last two columns.
Only about 8.4 percent of all immigrant households report owning housing prop-
erty in Germany. Distinguishing between immigrants with temporary and permanent
intentions reveals remarkable differences, however. While 14 percent of immigrants
with a permanent migration intention own housing property in Germany, only 5 per-
cent of those who wish to return do so. Likewise, the value of the housing stock is
much lower for the latter category.
In the next row we report home ownership in the home country. About 44 percent
of all immigrant household report to own property in the home country. Finally, the
last row combines this number with the proportion of immigrants who hold property in
Germany (ﬁrst row). Half of the immigrants hold property in either home- or host coun-
try. This contrasts with 44 percent of native born households that hold property. The
average value of immigrants’ property is about 30 percent lower than that of natives;
however, this may partly reﬂect lower property prices in the countries of origin.
In the next columns we distinguish again between immigrants with temporary and
permanent return plans. One in two immigrant households with return plans reports
owning housing stock in the home country, compared to just 31 percent of those with
permanent intentions. In addition, the value of property in the home country is more
than twice as high for those who wish to return. Overall, temporary migrants are more
likely to own property. However, the total value of home ownership is similar between
immigrant households who wish to return and those who do not.
The next panel reports information on asset holdings. Asset holdings refer to the
total amount of assets (including cash, savings, property, etc.) net of ﬁnancial obliga-
tions. For immigrants the questions draw a distinction between assets held in Germany,
and assets held in the home country. The numbers suggest that if we consider only
asset holdings of immigrants in the host country, the amount of asset holdings is con-
siderably lower than those of natives. However, this difference is signiﬁcantly reduced
when taking into account that immigrants hold assets also in the home country. There
is again a stark difference in the distribution of asset holdings between immigrants with
temporary and permanent intentions. While permanent migrants hold most of their as-
sets in the host country, temporary migrants hold assets mostly in the home country.4.4. Results 84
The total amount of asset holdings is slightly higher for permanent migrants.
To summarize, these ﬁgures show that - for any comparison between immigrant
and native households - it is important to consider immigrants’ savings and assets in the
country of origin. Further, the ﬁgures also show differences in savings, total property
and asset holdings between immigrants with temporary and permanent migration plans.
There are also stark differences between these two groups as to where those assets are
held. Immigrants with temporary migration plans hold less property and assets than im-
migrants with permanent plans in the host country, but more in the home country. This
points at different wealth allocation proﬁles between those migrants who want to return
and those who do not. It also suggests that the way immigrants may possibly affect the
housing market in the host- and the home country depends on their re-migration plans.
4.4.2 Conditional Results
We now focus on the differences between immigrants with temporary and permanent
migration plans. The numbers we report in Table 2 do not account for differences in
household- and individual characteristics. They also relate differences in asset holdings
to differences in contemporaneous intentions about a possible return. We now provide
some further results, where we condition on differences in household characteristics,
and use information about contemporaneous return plans (in the case of savings), and
average past return plans (in the case of asset holdings).
For both savings, home ownership and asset holdings, we estimate linear proba-
bility models (LPM) for the binary outcome variable, and OLS and Tobit models for
the amount of savings.
Savings
As we discuss in section 2, it is generally ambiguous whether immigrants with tem-
porary migration plans save more than immigrants with permanent plans. This is in
line with the ﬁgures in Table 2, which show that temporary migrants are more likely
to save both in the host- and the home country. Some of these differences may be due
to differences in composition between the two groups. To investigate this further, we
now present some conditional estimates, where we use data for two years of our panel
(1992 and 1994) that provide information on the amount of savings in each location.
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host country. If immigrants with temporary intentions have a higher propensity to save,
we should observe that they save more than those with permanent intentions overall. If
(in addition) temporary immigrants have a preference for shifting savings to the home
country, then the ratio of home- to host country savings should be positively related to
return plans.
Results are reported in the Table 3. In the ﬁrst column, we use the total amount of
savings as the dependent variable. Columns 2 and 3 distinguish between savings in the
home- and host country. Column 4 reports the ratio of savings in the home country and
total savings. We report LPM results in the ﬁrst panel, OLS results in the second panel
and Tobit results in the third panel.12 The point estimates on the temporary migration
variable in columns 1 suggest that overall, immigrants with temporary migration plans
save more than immigrants with permanent migration plans. Estimates are however
not statistically signiﬁcant. When splitting up savings into savings in the home- and
host country, temporary migration plans are positively and signiﬁcantly associated with
savings for the home country only. In the last column, we report the ratio of savings
in home vs host country, which is positively and signiﬁcantly related to return plans.
Thus, the estimates are consistent with the hypothesis that immigrants with temporary
migration plans have a preference to holding their savings in the origin country rather
than in the host country. They do not point at immigrants with temporary return plans
saving more than immigrants with permanent plans, conditional on other observable
characteristics.
Property and Assets Holdings
We now turn to property- and asset holdings of immigrants. Distinction between asset
holdings in the home- and in the host country is only available for one year (1988).
Assets measure the stock of assets accumulated up to 1988. As the stock of assets has
been accumulated over previous years, we use the average return intention for years
12Total amount of savings corresponds to the amount reported. See Table 4.6 for full regression
results with all the additional control variables for Total Savings. Those results suggest that both current
household income and employment of the head of the household affect savings positively. Age, years
since migration, and education of the head of household do not seem to be signiﬁcantly associated with
household savings conditional on household income and employment of the head of the household.4.4. Results 86
1984-1988 as a regressor.13
We show the results for property ownership in Table 4 and for overall asset hold-
ings in Table 5, using similar speciﬁcations as above. We report the coefﬁcient esti-
mates for the average of return intentions over the period 1984-1988.14 We report in
the ﬁrst column the total amount of property ownership, while columns 2 and 3 differ-
entiate between the property location in home and host country. Column 4 reports the
ratio of property holdings in the home country with respect to total property. The ﬁrst
panel shows the results of a simple LPM estimation on the binary outcome whether
migrants have any property holdings.
The results show that on average temporary migration plans are associated with
a 12.2 percentage points higher likelihood to hold property. Further, return plans are
negatively associated with owning housing property in the host country, but positively
associated with owning property at home. The intention to return to the home country
is associated with an 8 percentage points lower likelihood to own a house in the host
country, but an almost 20 percentage points higher likelihood to own a house in the
home country.
In the second and third panel of the Table, we report OLS and Tobit results for the
value of the property held (in 2002 Euros). These results indicate that the total value
of property that immigrants with temporary migration plans hold is not signiﬁcantly
different from that of those with permanent plans. However, there is a stark and sig-
niﬁcant difference in the property wealth allocation between host and home countries.
Those immigrants with temporary return plans hold a lower amount of property in the
host country and a higher amount of property in the home country, in both OLS and
Tobit speciﬁcations.
In the last column, we report again the impact of temporary migration plans on
the ratio between property held in the home country, and total property holdings. As
for savings, this ratio is strongly screwed towards holdings in the home country for
immigrants with temporary migration intentions, in both speciﬁcations.
13We only have information on return plans since the start of the panel in 1984.
14See Table 4.7 for the full set of regression results. Household income and household size are,
respectively, positively and negatively associated with asset accumulation. Furthermore, conditional
on household income and household size, households with older and better educated heads hold more
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We show the results for asset holdings in Table 5. Again, we report the coefﬁcient
estimates for the average of return intentions over the period 1984-1988. The structure
of the table is identical to the previous one. The results suggests that the total value of
assets held does not differ signiﬁcantly between temporary and permanent immigrants.
However, the geographical location as to where assets are held is different: Households
with temporary intentions hold more assets in the home country, and less in the host
country, after controlling for household income and other characteristics. As the results
in the last column show, the ratio of home country held assets to total assets is positively
related to return plans.
4.5 Conclusions
In this paper, we analyze savings and asset holdings of immigrants in relation to their
return plans. Our analysis distinguishes between savings, housing stock and assets held
in the home- and in the host country. We ﬁnd evidence that return plans are associated
with a different distribution of savings, property and assets between host- and home
country locations.
Our results show further that there is no signiﬁcant difference in total savings,
property and asset holdings between immigrants with permanent and temporary migra-
tion plans, conditional on observable household background characteristics. However,
immigrants with intentions to return are less likely to own property in the host coun-
try and more likely to own property in the home country, and this difference is quite
substantial. Thus, our study points at immigration policies that favor permanent migra-
tions having a different impact on the domestic housing market than policies that favor
temporary policies.
Temporary migration plans are also associated with holding a higher proportion of
savings and assets in the home countries. Finally, for both groups of immigrants assets
held in the home country are quite substantial. Thus another important ﬁnding of our
paper is that an assessment of immigrants’ wealth accumulation needs to take account
of wealth and assets accumulated in the home countries. This is more important, the
more migrations are of a temporary character.
We should emphasize again that the relationship between the temporariness of
migrations and savings- and asset accumulation behavior that we show in this paper4.5. Conclusions 88
should not be interpreted as causal. Nevertheless, our study points at possibly sub-
stantial differences in the location of savings- and asset holdings between immigrants
with different intentions about the permanency of their migration. Further, we ﬁnd no
evidence that total savings and assets held are different between these two groups.4.6. Data Construction Appendix 89
4.6 Data Construction Appendix
We use data from the German Socio-Economic Panel. Asset holdings are reported for
the year 1988, based on a special survey module. Savings are reported for the years
1992 and 1994. Our sample consists of immigrant households whose head was born in
Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia, Italy or Spain.
Information on return plans are provided in each wave of the panel. Individuals
were asked whether they intend to remain permanently in Germany, or whether they
wish to return home at some stage in the future. We construct a binary variable that
deﬁnes as temporary those who plan to return in the future.
As return plans may change, and asset accumulation is related to past return in-
tentions, we construct an average return intention variable for the last ﬁve years before
assets are measured (that is, 1984-1988).
All our income variables are reported in real terms (in Euros, deﬂated to the base
year 2002), and at household level. Household income corresponds to the net monthly
incomeofthehouseholdtransformedtoannuallevel. Theexactwordingofthequestion
is ”If everything is taken together: how high is the total monthly income of all the
household members at present? Please give the monthly net amount, the amount after
the deduction of tax and national insurance contributions. Regular payments such as
rent subsidy, child beneﬁt, government grants, subsistence allowances, etc., should be
included. If not known exactly, please estimate the monthly amount.”
Information on household savings in the home country is available for the years
1984-1990, 1992 and 1994, and corresponds to the yearly amount saved in the home
country by the household. The question asks individuals to declare the amount sent
or taken to the home country for the purpose of ”savings for later”; we transform this
variable to the household level. Information on household savings in the host country is
available for the year 1992 onwards and corresponds to the net monthly savings of the
household transformed to yearly level. The question survey asked is ”Do you usually
have an amount of money left over each month for major purchases, emergencies, or
savings? If yes, how much?”. This implies that information on savings in both the
home and the host country is available only for two years (1992 and 1994). For those
years, we construct the total amount of savings as the sum of savings in both locations.
We use asset information drawn from questions in a special survey in year 19884.6. Data Construction Appendix 90
where immigrants where asked for their asset holdings both in the home and in the host
country separately.
Asset holdings refer to the total amount of asset holdings (including cash, savings,
property, etc.) but net of ﬁnancial obligations, both in the home and host countries.
The wording of the question is ”If you could add up all the wealth of this household
(including cash, goods and property you own but without furniture), what will be the
approximate total value of it? Please make sure to subtract all the mortgages, loans
and credits that you could have on them”. Property includes the houses, apartments
or any other property at market prices, both in the home and host countries. For each
type of property, the wording of the question is ”Are you the owner of (speciﬁc type
of property)? If yes, how much do you estimate its commercial value is, that is, how
much money will you get if you sold it now?”. All entries correspond to the aggregated
household amounts declared in the year 1988, in Euros, deﬂated to the base year 2002.Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Age  45.63 9.46 45.37 12.13
Age At Arrival  26.12 7.87 22.60 9.53
Years Since Migration  19.46 5.00 22.80 5.97
Number Years Education  9.36 1.96 9.48 1.93
Household Income 25809 13811 24430 11110
Number Children in Household 0.71 1.03 0.89 1.07
Number Adults in Household 2.91 1.44 2.48 1.08
Number Employed Individuals in Household 1.63 0.94 1.54 0.94
Sex 0.91 0.29 0.85 0.36
Employed   0.82 0.39 0.76 0.43
Non Single  0.93 0.25 0.91 0.29
Native Partner  0.06 0.24 0.08 0.27
Spouse Abroad   0.06 0.23 0.03 0.17
Children Abroad   0.12 0.33 0.05 0.21
Rural Childhood   0.43 0.50 0.37 0.48
Temporary   0.67 0.47 0.44 0.50
Number of Observations 906 1686
Table 1 : Summary Statistics 
1988 1992 and 1994
Note: Calculations based on GSOEP data, 1988, 1992, 1994. Individual information 
corresponds to the head of household. Household Income in 2002 Euros. Sample in 1988 is 
used in the asset holdings analysis; sample in 1992 and 1994 is used in the savings 
analysis.
Table 4.1: Summary Statistics
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 Savings 
In Host Country
Proportion that saves 48.3% 1871 50.4% 782 46.7% 1089 3.6% 1.55
Average Amount 2046 1871 2218 782 1922 1089 297 1.74
(Std.Dev.) (3655) (3585) (3700)
Average Value as Percentage HH Income 7.4% 1809 8.0% 754 7.0% 1055 1.0% 1.89
In Home Country
Proportion 4.8% 1902 7.3% 797 3.0% 1105 4.3% ** 4.35
Average Amount 155 1902 230 797 101 1105 129 * 2.31
(Std.Dev.) (1207) (1127) (1259)
Average Value as Percentage HH Income 0.7% 1838 0.9% 769 0.5% 1069 0.3% 1.26
Total Sum Home and Host 
Country
Proportion 49.8% 1871 52.8% 782 47.6% 1089 5.2% * 2.24 65.4% 6901
Average Amount 2199 1871 2448 782 2021 1089 427 * 2.32 2888 6901
(Std.Dev.) (3921) (3835) (3974) (5101)
Average Value as Percentage HH Income 8.1% 1809 8.8% 754 7.5% 1055 1.3% * 2.17 9.9% 6688
 
 Home Ownership 
In Host Country
Proportion that Holds Property 8.4% 860 5.5% 577 14.1% 283 -8.6% ** -4.31
Average Value   13814 857 7324 575 27049 282 -19726 ** -4.91
(Std.Dev.) (55896) (38995) (78417)
In Home Country
Proportion that Holds Property 44.2% 859 50.5% 576 31.4% 283 19.1% ** 5.37
Average Value  30043 835 36764 560 16356 275 20408 ** 4.69
(Std.Dev.) (59823) (66816) (38792)
Total Sum Home and Host 
Country
Proportion that Holds Property 49.9% 859 53.8% 576 42.0% 283 11.8% ** 3.26 43.6% 3329
Average Value   44381 832 44443 558 44255 283 188 0.03 60973 3194
(Std.Dev.) (81167) (78167) (87108) (111939)
 Asset Holdings 
In Host Country
Proportion that Holds Assets 73.4% 629 74.0% 400 72.5% 229 1.5% 0.04
Average Value  31649 629 20805 400 50591 229 -29786 ** -3.76
(Std.Dev.) (96379) (126877) (128105)
In Home Country
Proportion that Holds Assets 71.6% 595 75.7% 423 61.6% 172 14.0% ** 3.46
Average Value  48723 595 54130 423 35424 172 18706 ** 2.76
(Std.Dev.) (75382) (81975) (53899)
Total Sum Home and Host 
Country
Proportion that Holds Assets 83.7% 486 84.3% 331 82.6% 155 1.7% 0.48 79.8% 2959
Average Value  66777 486 65949 331 68544 155 -2595 0.25 104966 2959
(Std.Dev.) (103651) (96608) (117606) (162877)
N
Mean 
Difference   Mean N  Mean N  Mean N
Note:  Calculations based on GSOEP data  on household level. Average amount (in 2002 Euros) not conditional on reporting any positive 
amount. Property Ownership includes house, apartment or any other property. Asset holdings refer to the total amount of asset holdings net 
of financial obligations, including cash, savings, property, etc. Savings in the host country corresponds to the net monthly savings of the 
household transformed to annual amount. Savings in the home country corresponds to the yearly amount remitted to the home country and 
that is saved. Both Property Ownership and Asset holdings refer to the year 1988. Savings Flows refer to years 1992 and 1994. We use all 
observations for which respective information is available.* significant mean difference at 5%; ** significant mean difference at 1%
Temporary - 
Permanent 
Migrants
Table 2:  Savings, Home Ownership and Assets 
Natives     Permanent 
Immigrants 
 Temporary 
Immigrants 
All 
Immigrants
t  Mean
Table 4.2: Savings, Home Ownership and Assets
92Total Host Country Home Country
Temporary 0.044 0.024 0.034***
(Std.E.) (0.028) (0.028) (0.013)
Ratio Home vs 
Total
Total Host Country Home Country
Temporary 14.09 -89.944 99.476 0.029***
(Std.E.) (233.296) (221.917) (60.442) (0.009)
Ratio Home vs 
Total
Total Host Country Home Country
Temporary 179.181 51.145 116.343*** 0.020***
(Std.E.) (166.524) (151.934) (41.013) (0.006)
Observations 1659 1659 1685 1680
Ratio Home vs 
Total
Total Host Country Home Country
Temporary -148.602 1529.99 -110.686 0.138
(Std.E.) (342.531) (1054.869) (367.049) (0.094)
Observations 808 86 835 81
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Note: GSOEP data (1992 and 1994). Household level. All specifications include time and 
country dummies and condition on age, years since migration (and its square), 
education, gender, marital status and employment status of the head of household as 
well as household income and number of adults and children in the host country 
household. Standard errors are clustered by household.  Tobit results show 
unconditional marginal effects. Reported coefficents correspond to the coefficient on the 
contemporary temporary intention variable.
 Table 3: Savings - Home and Host Country
Linear Probability Model
Savings (=1 Yes, =0 No)
OLS 
Amount Savings
OLS conditional on positive savings
Amount Savings
Tobit
Amount Savings
Table 4.3: Savings - Home and Host Country
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Temporary 0.122* -0.079** 0.190**
(Std.E.) (0.055) (0.03) (0.054)
Total Host Country Home Country
Ratio Home vs 
Total
Temporary 7456.369 -22919.058** 30939.940** 0.214**
(Std.E.) (8832.433) (5565.475) (6773.723) (0.054)
Total Host Country Home Country
Ratio Home vs 
Total
Temporary 11678.86 -4573.934** 28297.509** 0.243**
(Std.E.) (7608.978) (1520.867) (5849.031) (0.061)
Observations 739 738 719 739
Ratio Home vs 
Total
Total Host Country Home Country
Temporary -8355.309 -84037.543* 42852.049** 0.102**
(Std.E.) (15185.977) (32465.609) (14175.784) (0.035)
Observations 361 56 327 327
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Property Ownership (=1 Yes, =0 No)
Note: GSOEP data (1988). Household level. All specifications include time and country 
dummies and condition on age, years since migration (and its square), education, marital 
status, household income, employment status and number of adults and children in the 
host country household. Property ownership includes the purchase of house, apartment or 
any other property, in the host and in the home country. Tobit results show unconditional 
marginal effects. Reported coefficents correspond to the average intention to return up to 
1988 (1984-1988).
Table 4: Property Ownership - Home and Host Country
OLS 
Tobit
Amount Property 
Amount Property 
Linear Probability Model
OLS conditional on holding a positive amount of property
Amount Property
Table 4.4: Property Ownership - Home and Host Country
94Total Host Country Home Country
Temporary -0.036 0.002 0.096
(Std.E.) (0.053) (0.057) (0.059)
Total Host Country Home Country
Ratio Home vs 
Total
Temporary 6718.334 -29173.987** 28606.677** 0.133*
(Std.E.) (15522.831) (10146.918) (10310.560) (0.060)
Total Host Country Home Country
Ratio Home vs 
Total
Temporary 3510.74 -17238.395* 25472.782** 0.140*
(Std.E.) (12167.750) (6714.548) (8603.728) (0.068)
Observations 432 546 531 432
Ratio Home vs 
Total
Total Host Country Home Country
Temporary 11934.317 -39926.684** 35370.343* 0.107*
(Std.E.) (18033.572) (13546.568) (13945.360) (0.048)
Observations 368 407 391 302
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Amount Asset Holdings
Note: GSOEP data (1988). Household level. All specifications include time and country 
dummies and condition on age, years since migration (and its square), education, marital 
status, household income, employment status and number of adults and children in the 
host country household. Asset holdings refer to the total amount of asset holdings net of 
financial obligations, including cash, savings, property, etc., in the host and in the home 
country. Tobit results show unconditional marginal effects. Reported coefficents 
correspond to the average intention to return up to 1988 (1984-1988).
Table 5: Asset Holdings - Home and Host Country
Linear Probability Model
Asset Holdings (=1 Yes, =0 No)
OLS 
Amount Asset Holdings
Tobit
OLS conditional on positive asset holdings
Amount Asset Holdings
Table 4.5: Asset Holdings - Home and Host Country
95(=1 Yes, =0 No)
LPM OLS TOBIT
Age/10 -0.001 20.828 15.043
(Std.E.) (0.002) (20.377) (10.888)
Years Since Migration/10 0.063 -72.385 -44.678
(Std.E.) (0.100) (954.475) (579.814)
YSM-Squared/100 -0.019 -131.676 -92.917
(Std.E.) (0.024) (197.844) (133.413)
Log HH Income 0.286*** 2691.025*** 4072.837***
(Std.E.) (0.089) (935.280) (255.809)
Number Adults HH Host -0.047** -280.394 -469.503***
(Std.E.) (0.021) (219.850) (107.843)
Number Children HH Host -0.073*** -352.268*** -433.709***
(Std.E.) (0.014) (118.826) (79.531)
Employment Head HH 0.152*** 62.768 642.021***
(Std.E.) (0.038) (292.701) (233.220)
Number Employed HH 0.002 236.447 -212.843
(Std.E.) (0.029) (282.581) (129.628)
Number Years Education 0.003 -57.785 -57.937
(Std.E.) (0.007) (51.418) (38.930)
Male  Head HH 0.019 167.13 97.344
(Std.E.) (0.040) (469.024) (234.473)
Non Single -0.107** -829.918** -889.294***
(Std.E.) (0.049) (357.352) (288.561)
Native Partner 0.072 397.2 369.201
(Std.E.) (0.053) (403.186) (269.934)
Spouse Abroad 0.084 947.252 1127.213***
(Std.E.) (0.083) (623.977) (432.572)
Children Abroad -0.067 529.332 213.764
(Std.E.) (0.064) (665.530) (343.230)
Rural Childhood 0.047* 238.197 354.596**
(Std.E.) (0.028) (230.128) (154.448)
Temporary 0.044 14.09 179.181
(Std.E.) (0.028) (233.296) (166.524)
Number of Observations 1659 1659 1659
R-squared 0.142 0.151 0.024
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Amount
Note: GSOEP data (1992 and 1994). Household level. All specifications include time 
and country dummies. Standard errors are clustered by household.  
Appendix Table 1: Total Savings
Total Savings 
Table 4.6: Total Savings
96(=1 Yes, =0 No) (=1 Yes, =0 No)
LPM OLS TOBIT LPM OLS TOBIT
Age/10 0.065* 6992.39 8167.744* 0.066** 20423.945** 19354.011**
(Std.E.) (0.026) (4123.640) (3567.110) (0.025) (7165.884) (5616.612)
Years Since Migration/10 0.439* 13363.174 42990.847 0.084 -40474.467 -21355
(Std.E.) (0.223) (35502.003) (31944.141) (0.228) (66282.065) (52034.042)
YSM-Squared/100 -0.104 -1594.633 -9021.404 -0.035 12131.839 5675.163
(Std.E.) (0.055) (8818.495) (7884.666) (0.057) (16414.831) (12929.400)
Log HH Income 0.344** 57212.046** 58354.315** 0.342** 108771.151** 100564.981**
(Std.E.) (0.061) (9691.445) (8676.121) (0.062) (18119.010) (14485.252)
Number Adults HH Host -0.028 -6545.521* -6026.319** -0.03 -5194.61 -5626.295
(Std.E.) (0.016) (2666.964) (2269.345) (0.016) (4546.187) (3557.839)
Number Children HH Host -0.027 -932.913 -1940.823 -0.007 -79.446 -266.035
(Std.E.) (0.018) (2948.062) (2504.003) (0.017) (4933.143) (3833.999)
Employment Head HH 0.021 -1801.02 1709.037 0.028 14874.005 13933.759
(Std.E.) (0.058) (9181.844) (7806.949) (0.056) (16136.560) (12670.834)
Number Employed HH -0.013 -2358.308 -3104.786 -0.032 -15353.334* -13211.824*
(Std.E.) (0.029) (4635.975) (3859.390) (0.027) (7779.869) (6112.197)
Number Years Education -0.014 2321.072 366.429 -0.012 7329.063** 4813.823*
(Std.E.) (0.010) (1568.693) (1330.714) (0.009) (2737.697) (2151.789)
Male  Head HH 0.172 18773.464 25832.981 -0.007 29624.491 19496.307
(Std.E.) (0.094) (15077.112) (15119.807) (0.127) (36803.571) (28689.586)
Native Partner 0.015 25354.86 17984.492 -0.025 66389.392* 51424.168*
(Std.E.) (0.081) (13105.281) (11312.488) (0.101) (29301.068) (22861.355)
Spouse Abroad -0.068 -9697.935 -8631.509 -0.084 -19941.21 -19590.228
(Std.E.) (0.087) (13894.105) (11827.956) (0.081) (23635.383) (18863.518)
Children Abroad 0.128* 13884.182 15725.938* 0.006 25068.459 19478.381
(Std.E.) (0.057) (9335.730) (7599.675) (0.052) (15167.549) (11837.909)
Rural Childhood -0.01 5437.249 3562.898 -0.006 6965.387 4994.18
(Std.E.) (0.037) (5901.585) (4932.460) (0.034) (9993.592) (7791.598)
Temporary 0.122* 7456.369 11678.86 -0.036 6718.334 3510.74
(Std.E.) (0.055) (8832.433) (7608.978) (0.053) (15522.831) (12167.750)
Number of Observations 738 718 718 432 432 432
R-squared 0.138 0.117 0.011 0.131 0.18 0.01
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Appendix Table 2: Total Property and Asset Holdings
Note: GSOEP data (1992 and 1994). Household level. All specifications include time and country dummies. 
Standard errors are clustered by household.  
Total Property  Total Asset Holdings
Amount Amount
Table 4.7: Total Property and Asset Holdings
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5.1 Introduction
Migrants constitute a self-selected group in terms of skills with respect to the non-
migrant populations of their origin countries. This selection has been long of interest
because of its important implications both for host and home countries. In the host
country, migrants’ impact on natives’ labour market outcomes depends on their skill
composition. In particular, migrants’ skill selection affect which natives are affected
and in which way.
In the home country, the impact of migration on non-migrants depends as well on
the skill selection of those who emigrate relative to those who stay. Relative wages
between low and high skilled in the origin country are affected by the composition of
those who leave. For the case of Mexico, Mishra (2007) has shown the positive cor-
relation between Mexican wages and emigration. Aydemir & Borjas (2007) has also
shown how labour supply shifts are associated with wage changes of the opposite sign
in Mexico. In addition, migration has also welfare implications in the home country
and might help reduce inequalities (McKenzie & Rapoport (2010)).
Given those important implications, it is not surprising that migrant selection has
been an extensive subject of analysis in the migration literature. From the seminal
works of Sjaastad (1962) and Borjas (1987) to the more recent study of Chiquiar &
Hanson (2005), the selection of migrants and its implications have been debated. Bor-
jas (1987) argued that in those countries with high relative returns to skills, those who
are relatively low skilled will migrate to countries with lower relative returns. This
negative selection hypothesis has been contested by Chiquiar & Hanson (2005), who
had found a positive or intermediate selection of migrants. Chiswick (1999) and Orre-
nius & Zavodny (2005) have supported as well this positive or intermediate selection.
Recent papers by Ibarraran & Lubotsky (2005) and Fernandez-Huertas (2009) have
found negative selection using Mexican-based surveys. McKenzie & Rapoport (2007)
have used networks to reconcile both results, arguing that positive selection is observed
for those individuals that do not rely on networks while negative selection is found for
those who do.
Our study contributes to this literature on migrant selection on several dimen-5.1. Introduction 100
sions. First of all, it emphasizes the importance of differentiating between age cohorts
in order to establish migrant selection and its implications. Secondly, it analyzes mi-
grant selection among three components: education, wages and test scores. Finally, it
evaluates recent Mexican migrant selection to the United States using a unique dataset
representative of the overall Mexican population at a point in time and that follows
those individuals that migrate afterwards. To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study that
uses this well-suited dataset to analyze migrant selection in Mexico.
Our results show that studying migrant selection without differentiating between
age cohorts might be misleading if most migrants belong to a particular age group.
Without differentiating between age cohorts, negative selection in education is found
for males and positive selection for females. However, given the strong age gradient,
these results change when focusing only on the young cohort, where almost the totality
of migrants belong. Among the young, migrants are always negatively selected with
respect to education, both overall and differentiating between men and women. In this
sense, the negative selection of young migrants found is in line with the basic Borjas
model1, since the relative returns to education are higher in Mexico than in the US.
The fact that most emigrants belong to the young cohort is important because, if
age cohorts are imperfect substitutes between each other, the effects of migration on
different cohorts of non-migrants in the home country will differ. Emigration of young
low skilled might lead to higher relative wages of low-skilled young (compared to the
high-skilled young), with no effect on the old cohort. This result will differ to what we
would predict not distinguishing between age groups, ﬁrst because we will not identify
adequately self-selection (the issue addressed in this paper), and secondly because the
groups affected will be different (Card & Lemieux (2001)).
The importance of differentiating between age cohorts analyzed in this chapter
has been also highlighted in the previous chapters while analyzing the temporariness of
migration and how it is related to migrants’ behaviour. We have seen in chapter 2 that
migrants have different intentions to stay in the host country at different ages (see, for
1Borjas (1987)5.2. Data 101
example, Figures 2.7, 2.8 and 2.9). Migrants also modify differently their intentions
to stay at different age cohorts as a reaction to the same shock. For example, changes
in relative income between home and host countries have a much higher impact on the
intentions to stay in the country for younger migrants with a potentially longer working
life than for older migrants.
This chapter studies migrant skill selection among emigrants from the home to the
host country. Migrants with different educational levels might have different expected
length of stay in the host country. For example, highly-educated migrants might leave
their home country for a short period to acquire further skills. Lower-educated mi-
grants, on the other hand, might have longer migrations planned in the host country. In
addition to the expected length of migration, migrants with different educational levels
behave differently in many other aspects, like remitting behaviour (chapter 3) or saving
and asset accumulation (chapter 4). For all these reasons, it is important to properly
identify migrant selection to the host country.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the Mexican Fam-
ily Life Survey (MxFLS) dataset, its advantages with respect to previous datasets and
summarizes the sample used. Section 3 explains the important age gradient of migra-
tion in Mexico and the implication it has given the educational changes occurred in that
country. Section 4 shows migrant selection results in terms of education, wages and
test scores and ﬁnally, section 5 concludes.
5.2 Data
5.2.1 The Mexican Family Life Survey
We use the MxFLS data, a longitudinal survey representative of all Mexican popula-
tion, including both urban and rural areas, similar to other family life surveys like the
Indonesia Family Life Survey. It includes information regarding the individual, the
household as well as their communities. The ﬁrst wave was conducted in 2002 and
a sample of 8,440 households (over 35,000 individuals) were interviewed. The sec-
ond wave was conducted in 2005, when 8,434 households (almost 37,000 individuals)
where interviewed.5.2. Data 102
This dataset is ideal to study the migration process because a special emphasis
was made in tracking down the individuals that moved to another locality, state or
country between 2002 and 2005. Individuals provide details of family and friends to be
contacted in case they are not living in the same household in following rounds. Thus,
it was possible to differentiate between those individuals that migrated to the United
States from other types of moves or non-response. Individuals that migrated to the
United States, in addition, were re-contacted there, with a successful re-contact rate of
91 percent.2
The dataset is not only adequate to study the migration process per se but also to
study the migrant selection in particular, as it contains information of all the population
in the home country at one point in time and has as well an indicator of those who
moved to the host country during the period after. The MxFLS includes those individ-
uals living in Mexico in the ﬁrst wave that migrated to the United States by the time
of the second round in 2005 (and stayed there for at least one year3). Around 2.4% of
the sample (854 individuals) in 2002 were identiﬁed as migrants in the US during the
second wave of MxFLS in 2005.4
The dataset provides as well measures of educational attainment, wages and in-
dividual skill level on which the selection is based. With respect to education, both
the number of years in education and the educational level attained are available in the
data. Years of education correspond to the difference between the age the individual
started school and the age it ﬁnished school (or his actual age if still in schooling).
Wage information corresponds to the 2002 hourly wage earned in Mexico prior
to migration, constructed in a similar way that Chiquiar & Hanson (2005) did. Those
0.5% individuals with the lowest wage and those 0.5% individuals with the highest
2See Rubalcava & Teruel (2006, 2008) for a detailed description of the dataset and its construction.
3Those individuals that migrated after their interview in 2002 and returned before the second inter-
viewarenotconsideredinourstudygiventhattheyonlyleaveMexicoforashortperiodbeforereturning.
In any case, they represent only a small fraction of all the population. In 2005, for example, 0.2% of the
sample had migrated temporarily to Mexico for less than 12 months in the previous two years.
4Of those, more than 90 percent (774 individuals) were successfully re-interviewed.5.2. Data 103
wage were excluded.
In additional, Raven cognitive tests are performed to both adults and children.
These tests are an alternative measure of their skill levels (independently of their ed-
ucational level) and do not require literacy of those who perform the test. The scores
range from 0 to 100 points. This skill measure will be used in addition to educational
achievement and wages to study migrant selection. Please see the data appendix for
further details on the variables deﬁnitions and construction.
5.2.2 Comparison with previous datasets used in the literature
A ﬁrst candidate to study the selection of Mexican migrants in the United States is
the U.S. Census (as used by Borjas (1987) and Chiquiar & Hanson (2005)). However,
the existing sample in the Census has been recognized as being a non-random sample
of the overall migrant Mexican population in the United States (Ibarraran & Lubotsky
(2005), Fernandez-Huertas (2009)). It undercounts illegal migrants which constitute an
important share of all migrants and which are likely to be less educated.
In addition, it overreports the educational attainment of those migrants whose
education is not observed (Ibarraran & Lubotsky (2005), as the educational level used
for the imputation come from the native-born population (who have higher attainment
educational levels than their foreign-born counterparts). Both facts increase the likeli-
hood of overreporting the actual educational attainment of Mexican migrants in the US.
Alternatively, the Mexican census can be used as it identiﬁes those households that
have an individual household member in the US. Ibarraran & Lubotsky (2005) used it
in conjunction with the US Census to study the migrant selection. However, it is not
possible to know the educational attainment of those migrants that left the household.
In addition, the Census does not record those households where all migrants moved to
the US, and thus they are not included in the migrant group.
Another survey that has been widely used to study migrant selection is the Mexi-
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only a particular set of rural communities in Mexico, it is not representative of neither
all non-migrant nor all migrant population.
Finally, two other Mexican surveys that have been recently used to study migrant
selection are ENADID (McKenzie & Rapoport (2010)) and ENET (Fernandez-Huertas
(2009)). Both surveys cover all non-migrant Mexican population, but include only
those migrants that have returned or that have at least one household member still living
in Mexico. There is no information on those households where all the members moved
to the United States. As Fernandez-Huertas (2009) explains, if those households that
move all members to the US are more educated, this might bias the study of migrant
selection towards negative selection.
The MxFLS has advantages over all previous datasets mentioned before in order
to analyze migrant selection in Mexico. Unlike the MMP, the MxFLS covers all regions
in Mexico and is constructed to be a nationally representative sample. In addition, it is
a representative sample of all the Mexican population at a point in time (2002), before
migration occurs, that collects re-contact information for the household as well as for
relatives that can be contacted if they move. Thus, it has few undercounting of illegal
and young Mexican migrants in US unlike the US Census. Furthermore, it allows to
identify those households that moved all their members to the US (unlike the Mexican
Census the ENET and the ENADID datasets).
The MxFLS has also an additional advantadge, as both migrants and non-migrants
report not only their educational attainment, but also their wages and other individual
characteristics. Thus, it is possible to analyze migrant selection not only based on
education but also based on wages and cognitive skills.
The MxFLs has however the two main shortcomings. The dataset is a survey ,with
a smaller sample size than the Census (although the sample size is similar to ENET).
Secondly, it covers only recent migrants that migrated after 2002, stayed over 1 year in
U.S. and did not return by 2005. It does not include thus those who migrated prior to
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5.2.3 Basic Descriptives
This section analyzes the characteristics of recent Mexican migration to the United
States as well as of those who remain in Mexico. The sample used in this study repre-
sents all Mexican population aged 12 to 62 in 2002 (that is, those of working-age 15-65
when they are re-interviewed in the following wage (2005)). Table 1 shows the main
descriptives for all the population as well as migrants and non-migrant populations.5
Around 2.4% of the sample migrated to the United States between 2002 and 2005
and were still in the U.S. in 2005. While individuals in the sample are on average 31
years old, migrants are more than 6 years younger than non-migrants. The average
educational attainment is 8.6 years, with small overall difference between migrants and
non-migrants6. Almost 35 percent of the population have primary education (or no
schooling). Around half have secondary education and 15 percent have tertiary edu-
cation. Migrants to the US are more likely to have a lower secondary degree, but less
likely to have a college university degree. Migrants are more likely to have an indige-
nousoraruralbackgroundthanfornon-migrants, andtheyarealsomorelikelytowork.
However, a similar percentage of migrants and non-migrants receives labour income
(around 41 percent). Unconditional on working or not, average income is almost 1300
dollars, although migrants to the US earned a substantially lower amount (around 850
dollars) in Mexico before migrating to the U.S.. In terms of wealth holdings, around
81 percent of the households seem to own the home where they live. Migrants seem
to live in households with lower savings and lower ﬁnancial assets that non-migrants.
However, both type of households have a similar proportion of debts.
Migration is present in Mexicans’ everyday life, even for those that do not directly
migrate. One in three Mexicans has a direct relative that migrated to the United States
(one in two has someone in the household that has a relative in the United States).
The proportion of individuals with direct links to relatives that migrated to the U.S. is
even higher for those who migrated after being interviewed: almost two in three have
a direct relative that migrated to the U.S. (four in ﬁve have someone in the household
who has relatives that migrated there).
5See Annex 1 and 2 for the main descriptives by gender and age cohort
6In section 4, a detailed analysis of migrants and non-migrants educational attainment is performed5.3. Age, Education and Recent Emigration in Mexico 106
Around 20 percent of the Mexican population plans to migrate to another locality,
state or country (although only 3.4 percent plans to move to another country). Those
who migrated between 2002 and 2005 declared in 2002 a much higher intention to
migrate: almost one in three planned to move to another locality, state or country, and
almost 14 percent declared that they plan to move to another country. Finally, 5.8
percent of all the population have an earlier migration experience, but only 0.9 percent
of all the population have migratory experience outside Mexico. Those individuals that
migrated between 2002 and 2005 have only a slightly higher migration experience in
2002 than those that did not migrate.
5.3 Age, Education and Recent Emigration in Mexico
Educational attainment in Mexico has increased dramatically in the last forty years.
This increase is due both to educational reforms that increased the minimum schooling
age and to the expansion in access to education.7. In graph 2, using IPUMS Mexican
Census data8, we show the educational attainment from 1970 to 2005 for different age
groups. Overall, the average number of years in education has increased from 3.4
in 1970 to 6.2 in 1990, 7.5 in 2000 and 8.1 in 2005. This increase in educational
attainment has been seen in all age groups, and both for males and females. Given
this increase in educational attainment over time, younger individuals have been in
education for a longer period than older individuals. For example, in 2005 an average
individual aged 25 to 29 had been in school on average almost two years more than an
individual aged 45 to 49 (9.6 years instead of 7.7).
On the other hand, the age gradient of those who leave Mexico is particularly
acute: individuals that migrate are much younger than those that do not. Graph 1
shows the age distribution boxplot of migrants and non-migrants aged 12 to 62 in
2002, both for the overall population and for males and females separately. In all
graphs we can observe that leavers are much younger than stayers. Only 25 percent of
7See for example Paul Gertler & Codina (2007) for a summary of education policy reforms in Mexico
and the expansion in access to education in the past decades.
8Minnesota Population Center. Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) (2010).5.4. Migrant Selection 107
future migrants are over 28 years old in 2002, compared to more than 50 percent of
non-migrants. The median age of migrants is 22 years, eight years younger than non-
migrants. In comparison with male migrants, female migrants seems to leave Mexico
at a later age. This might be due to the fact that many women are tied movers, only
moving to the United States some years after their husbands have been established in
the country.
This different age gradient between those individuals that migrate between 2002
and 2005 and those who do not is important given the change in educational attainment
that occurred over time in Mexico described before. A comparison between migrants
from a younger cohort to non-migrants mostly belonging to an older cohort in terms
of years of education could show a misleading positive difference between the two
groups due to the structural changes in educational attainment in Mexico occurred in
the last three decades. It is important to study the selection of migrants with respect
to education for similar age groups. This is the analysis performed in the following
section.
5.4 Migrant Selection
5.4.1 Education
Table 2 shows the average number years of education as well as selected percentiles
of the distribution for migrants and non-migrants, overall and differentiating by age
cohort. The ﬁrst panel shows the overall distribution, while the second and third show
the distributions for males and females respectively. Young cohorts correspond to those
individuals aged 12 to 29 in 2002 (and thus of working age at the moment they are
re-contacted, in 2005), while old cohorts correspond to those individuals aged 30 to 62
in 2002 (33 to 65 in 2005).
Without differentiating between age cohorts, it would seem then that migrants
and non-migrants have a similar educational attainment (ﬁrst and second rows). Non-
migrants have on average 8.6 years of schooling while migrants have 8.5 years. How-
ever, when separating between young and old cohorts, the results change substantially.
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lected, with an average of 9 years of education, 0.8 years less than young non-migrants.
Old migrants are also negatively selected with respect to non-migrants, with an average
educational attainment of 7.4 years, half a year less than non-migrants (ﬁfth and sixth
rows). These different results show how important is to study migrant selection among
those groups with similar ages, and the incorrect results we might arrive to without
doing so.
However, given the different educational attainment between genders in Mexico
(seegraph2), wedescribetheresultsformalesandfemalesseparatelyinthesecondand
third panels. When analyzing migrant selection separately between males and females,
there seems to be a negative selection for males and a positive selection for females.
However, these results change separating young and old cohorts. For the young cohort,
migrants have a lower educational attainment than non-migrants, both for the case of
males and females. The third and fourth rows of the second panel show that young
males that will migrate have 8.9 years of education, compared to 10.1 of non-migrants.
The third and fourth rows of the third panel show that young females went to school
for an average of 9.1 years, compared to 9.7 for their non-migrant counterparts.
It should be emphasized that even if young migrants are negatively selected with
respect to young non-migrants, they have a higher educational attainment than the
old cohorts, both compared to non-migrants and migrants (ﬁfth and sixth rows of the
second and third panel respectively).
The comparison of migrants and non-migrants at the young cohort where most mi-
grants belong gives a negative migrant selection result in terms of years of education,
both for males and females.9 Alternatively, we analyze the educational levels attained
among migrants and non-migrants and differentiating between age cohorts and reach
the same conclusion (see graph 3).10 The increase in educational attainment between
age cohorts in Mexico described in the previous section can be observed in the ﬁrst col-
9This result contrasts with Chiquiar & Hanson (2005) when they considered analyzing migrant se-
lection of only those in a young cohort, aged 26-35, and found a positive selection (table 3, p.251). As
mentioned in section 2, their sample was a non-random sample of Mexican migrants, positively biased
in terms of educational attainment of migrants.
10Educational levels correspond to ISCED levels 0, 1 and 2 for Primary education, ISCED levels 3
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umn’s graphs. The proportion of individuals with a primary degree is much higher for
the old cohort, while the proportion of individuals with secondary and tertiary degrees
is much higher for the young cohort, both for migrants and non-migrants. This change
among cohorts can be observed as well differentiating between male (second column)
and female (third column), where young and old cohorts have very different educa-
tional level distributions. Young male and female migrants have a lower educational
attainment that their young non-migrant counterparts (but a higher educational attain-
ment than older cohorts). The same negative selection conclusion for both young male
and female migrants is obtained using educational levels than using years of education.
5.4.2 Wages
Now we discuss the selection with respect to wage earnings, locating young Mexican
migrants in the wage distribution in 2002 for individuals in the same age cohort. In
order to do so, we compare wages earned in 2002 by migrants and non-migrants before
migrating.11. A further concern in this comparison is that migrants might have suffered
a negative income shock prior to the departure from their origin country (for example,
bad weather severely affected the amount of income they earned) and their observed
wages might be exceptionally low following the negative shock (Ashenfelter dip).12
Having this caveat in mind, it is still interesting to compare the wage distributions be-
tween these two populations and see if the different results obtained differ with respect
to those of educational attainment.
Table 3 shows the average wage as well as selected percentiles of the distribution
for migrants and non-migrants, overall and differentiating by age cohort, for all and for
males and females separately, using the same structure than in table 2.
Overall, migrants are negatively selected with respect to wages, both at the mean
as well as in all points of the distribution. However, when we differentiate among
age cohorts, this selection is less clear. This is particularly the case for the young
11Unfortunately, wages in the United States in 2005 for those that migrate are not reported in the data,
and thus we are not able to compare them with wages of non-migrants, both in Mexico and in the United
States
12Nevertheless, Fernandez-Huertas (2009) showed that those individuals in Mexico that migrate did
not seem to suffer a negative shock prior to migration during the period 2000 to 2004, using the ENADID
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cohort, where both the mean and the percentiles of the wage distribution are quite
similar between migrant and non-migrant young populations.
In order to better appreciate the differences between males and females shown in
the second and third panels, we show the distribution functions of migrant and non-
migrant Mexicans, by gender and age cohort, in graph 4. Additionally, the difference
in the distribution functions between migrant and non-migrant populations is shown in
graph 5. For example, let’s focus on the middle graphs that correspond to the young
cohorts where the majority of the migrants belong. For males (middle-top ﬁgures in
graphs 4 and 5), it is clear that migrants are negatively selected compared to non-
migrants. The positive mass on the left of the median (shown as a vertical line) in
graph 5 shows that there is a greater proportion of migrants below that point, while
the negative mass on the right of the median signals the opposite. For females (middle-
bottom ﬁgures in graphs 4 and 5), we can observe a positive mass at the extremes of the
wage distribution, and a negative mass at the middle. This signals a mixed selection,
where female migrants are more likely to be located at the bottom or at the top of the
wage distribution (and less likely at the middle). Nevertheless, selective participation
into the labour market is more accute for females (only 30.8% of females work in 2002
(Table5.7), amuchlowerproportionthanformales(63.9%, Table5.6). Thus, measures
of selection using education and skills might be more reliable, as they not suffer from
this selective participation into the labour market.
5.4.3 Test Scores
Finally, the MxFLS provides us with an alternative way to measure migrant selection
in terms of skills by using individual test scores. This additional skill measure has not
bet been used in the literature, in particular because standard datasets do not have it
available. All individuals that took part in the survey did a Raven test used to estab-
lish their cognitive abilities. Table 4 shows the mean test scores (the score goes from
zero (minimum) to 100 (maximum)) as well as the scores at several percentiles of the
distribution, for all and differentiating between gender and age cohort. The structure is
identical to that of tables 2 (years of education) and 3 (wages). If we focus our attention
to the young cohort, to which most of the migrants belong, we can observe a negative
migrant selection at the mean as well as at all percentiles of the distribution. The same5.5. Conclusion 111
negatives selection result is found separating between young males and young females.
As the ability to answer the cognitive test could different among the individual life
cycle, we control for the age effects by doing a simple ordinary least squares regres-
sions of test scores with respect to age and an indicator of migration between 2002 and
2005. Results shown in table 5.8 conﬁrm the negative selection in terms of skills of
those migrants that decide to migrate, even after controlling for age effects. Male mi-
grants have a test score 6.2 points lower than their non-migrant counterparts and female
migrants 5.8 points lower.
5.4.4 Robustness Tests
Several robustness checks have been performed using alternative age cohort deﬁnitions.
In table 5.9, we show the results of using an young cohort deﬁnition corresponding to
those aged 12 to 36. While the average education, wage and test scores are different
than before, the same patterns are observed: negative selection among young cohorts
in terms of years of education and test scores, and to a lesser extent, on wages.
Alternatively, we use a young cohort of older age, corresponding to those aged
20-29 in 2002 (aged 23-32 in 2005), in order to avoid including individuals still in
education. Using this cohort, as described in section 3, many migrants that migrate
at younger ages are excluded. In any case, as we can observe in table 5.10, the main
results remain unchanged.
5.5 Conclusion
This study has analyzed migrant skill selection of recent migrants to the United States
using the Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS). We showed the important age gradi-
ent of migration and the different education attainment between age cohorts in Mexico,
and highlighted the importance of studying migrant selection for comparable age co-
horts. Contrary to recent ﬁndings, we show that there is a migrant negative selection
for young males, both in terms of years of education, wages and test scores. Young
females are also negatively selected in terms of years of education and test scores,
while they have very-negative and very-positive selection in terms of wages. Our study5.5. Conclusion 112
shows that focusing on the relevant age cohort can change the results found regarding
migrant selection, and thus, modify its effects in both host and home countries.5.6. Data Construction Appendix 113
5.6 Data Construction Appendix
Migrants are deﬁned in this study as those individuals that moved to the United States
between 2002 and 2005 and were still there in 2005 (with a minimum stay of 12
months). A re-contact directory was created with up to two different contact persons
that might know their future location and contact details in case they move. This al-
lowed to re-contact most of those migrants in the United States in 2005 as well.
Years of education are constructed as the difference between the age the individual
started and ﬁnished school. In case the individual is still attending school, years of ed-
ucation are deﬁned as the difference in years between the start age and the actual age.
For those individuals that do no declare the age they started or ﬁnished, the equivalent
years of education corresponding to their education level are used. Educational levels
correspond to ISCED levels 0, 1 and 2 for Primary education, 3 and 4 for Secondary
and 5 and 6 for Tertiary.
Wage refers to the net hourly wage earned in 2002 in Mexico, in 2002 dollars,
constructed in a similar way as Chiquiar & Hanson (2005). It corresponds to the re-
ported monthly work-related net income in the previous month divided by the number
of hours worked last week times 4.5. Those 0.5% individuals with the lowest wage
and those 0.5% individuals with the highest wage are excluded as well. Wage is only
deﬁned for those individuals that had a job the month before they were interviewed and
reported both their monthly earnings and the number of hours worked last week.
The test scores correspond to the results of a Raven’s progressive matrix test.
These tests are designed to measure the individual’s cognitive ability and do not re-
quire literacy of those who perform the test. The scores range from 0 to 100 points;
individuals that answered all questions successfully have a score of 100. More details
regarding the test and their precise questions and answers can be found in Rubalcava &
Teruel (2006).Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev.
Migration US 2.4% 15.2%
Age 31.2 14.0 31.3 14.1 24.8 9.5
Female 56% 50% 56% 50% 38% 49%
Years Education 8.6 3.6 8.6 3.7 8.5 3.0
Primary 40% 49% 41% 49% 39% 49%
Secondary 48% 50% 48% 50% 57% 49%
Tertiary 12% 32% 12% 32% 4% 20%
Spanish Speaker 98.2% 13.4% 98.2% 13.3% 97.6% 15.2%
Indigenous 12.6% 33.2% 12.3% 32.9% 22.2% 41.6%
Rural 41.1% 49.2% 40.5% 49.1% 68.3% 46.5%
Employed 45.4% 49.8% 45.4% 49.8% 48.0% 50.0%
Receives Income 40.6% 49.1% 40.5% 49.1% 41.2% 49.2%
Amount Income 1283 2372 1293 2385 844 1649
Previous Migration 5.8% 23.4% 5.8% 23.4% 6.2% 24.1%
 -"- outside Mexico 0.9% 9.3% 0.8% 9.1% 2.3% 15.0%
Potential Migration 20.5% 40.3% 20.2% 40.1% 31.4% 46.4%
 -"- outside Mexico 3.3% 17.9% 3.1% 17.2% 13.9% 34.6%
Relatives in USA 33.8% 47.3% 33.0% 47.0% 64.7% 47.8%
Anyone in Household(HH)  -"-  48.7% 50.0% 47.9% 50.0% 79.9% 40.1%
HH Home Ownership Indicator 80.7% 39.5% 80.7% 39.5% 82.6% 37.9%
HH Financial Assets Indicator 17.2% 37.7% 17.3% 37.8% 12.3% 32.9%
HH Savings Indicator 16.9% 37.5% 17.1% 37.6% 11.6% 32.0%
HH Debts Indicator 37.1% 48.3% 37.1% 48.3% 37.2% 48.3%
Number Observations
Number Equivalent Observations 
in Mexican Population 68,200,000 1,657,447
Migrant US
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
Note: Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS), 2002. Weighted Statistics. Migrant US 
identifies those Mexican migrants in the United States in 2005 that migrated after 2002 and 
have stayed over 1 year.Population Aged 12-62 in 2002 (15-65 in 2005).
All Non Migrant US
25,820 25,076 744
69,900,000
Table 5.1: Summary Statistics
114Graph 1 . Age Distribution Boxplot - Mexican Non-Migrant vs. Migrant
Note: Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS), 2002. Weighted Statistics. Migrant US identifies those 
Mexican migrants in the United States in 2005 that migrated after 2002 and have stayed over 1 year. 
Population Aged 12-62 in 2002 (15-65 in 2005).
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Figure 5.1: Age Distribution Boxplot - Mexican Non-Migrant vs. Migrant
115Graph 2 . Educational Attainment in Mexico over time (1970-2005), by age groups.
Note: Mexican Census, 1970, 1990, 2000 and 2005. "All" refers to all population aged 10 to 64, while 
"25 to 29" and "45 to 49" refers to those populations aged  25 to 29 and 45 to 49 respectively in each 
Census.
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Figure 5.2: Educational Attainment in Mexico over time (1970-2005), by age groups.
116Mean p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
All
Non-Migrant 8.6 6 6 9 12 14
Migrant 8.5 6 6 9 10 12
Young (12-29) Non-Migrant 9.8 6 9 9 12 14
Young (12-29) Migrant 9.0 6 7 9 11 12
Old (30-62) Non-Migrant 7.9 6 6 6 9 14
Old (30-62) Migrant 7.4 6 6 6 9 12
Male
Non-Migrant 9.1 6 6 9 12 14
Migrant 8.5 6 6 9 10 12
Young (12-29) Non-Migrant 10.1 6 9 9 12 14
Young (12-29) Migrant 8.9 6 6 9 11 12
Old (30-62) Non-Migrant 8.6 6 6 9 12 14
Old (30-62) Migrant 7.1 6 6 6 9 12
Female
Non-Migrant 8.2 6 6 9 11 13
Migrant 8.6 6 6 9 11 12
Young (12-29) Non-Migrant 9.7 6 9 9 12 14
Young (12-29) Migrant 9.1 6 7 9 12 12
Old (30-62) Non-Migrant 7.4 0 6 6 9 12
Old (30-62) Migrant 7.7 6 6 9 9 12
Note: Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS), 2002. Weighted 
Statistics. Migrant US identifies those Mexican migrants in the United 
States in 2005 that migrated after 2002 and have stayed over 1 year. 
Population Aged 12-62 in 2002 (15-65 in 2005). "Young" refers to 
those individuals aged 12-29 in 2002 (15-32 in 2005); "Old" refers to 
Table 2: Number of Years of Education - Distribution Among 
Migrant and Non-Migrant Mexicans
Table 5.2: Number of Years of Education - Distribution Among Migrant and Non-
Migrant Mexicans
117Graph 3 . Educational Level - Distribution Among Migrant and Non-Migrant Mexicans
Note: Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS), 2002. Weighted Statistics. Migrant US identifies those Mexican migrants in the United 
States in 2005 that migrated after 2002 and have stayed over 1 year. Population Aged 12-62 in 2002 (15-65 in 2005). "Young" refers 
to those individuals aged 12-29 in 2002 (15-32 in 2005); "Old" refers to those aged 30-62 in 2002 (33-65 in 2005).
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Table 5.3: Educational Level - Distribution Among Migrant and Non-Migrant Mexi-
cans
118Table 3: Wages in Mexico in 2002  - Distribution Among Migrant and Non-Migrant Mexicans
Mean p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
All
Non-Migrant 2.2 0.5 0.9 1.4 2.5 4.6
Migrant 1.8 0.4 0.7 1.0 1.7 3.3
Young (12-29) Non-Migrant 1.6 0.4 0.7 1.1 1.8 3.1
Young (12-29) Migrant 1.7 0.5 0.7 1.0 1.4 2.9
Old (30-62) Non-Migrant 2.5 0.6 1.0 1.6 2.9 5.4
Old (30-62) Migrant 2.1 0.3 0.6 1.2 3.0 5.9
Male
Non-Migrant 2.2 0.5 0.9 1.4 2.5 4.6
Migrant 1.8 0.5 0.7 1.0 1.5 3.1
Young (12-29) Non-Migrant 1.7 0.4 0.8 1.2 1.8 3.1
Young (12-29) Migrant 1.7 0.4 0.7 0.9 1.4 2.9
Old (30-62) Non-Migrant 2.4 0.6 1.0 1.7 2.8 5.2
Old (30-62) Migrant 2.1 0.5 0.6 1.1 3.0 5.9
Female
Non-Migrant 2.2 0.5 0.8 1.3 2.6 4.9
Migrant 1.8 0.4 0.7 1.4 1.8 5.2
Young (12-29) Non-Migrant 1.5 0.4 0.7 1.1 1.7 3.1
Young (12-29) Migrant 1.6 0.7 0.8 1.4 1.8 3.2
Old (30-62) Non-Migrant 2.6 0.6 1.0 1.5 3.1 5.7
Old (30-62) Migrant 2.1 0.1 0.5 1.5 3.3 5.2
Note: Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS), 2002. Weighted Statistics. 
Migrant US identifies those Mexican migrants in the United States in 2005 
that migrated after 2002 and have stayed over 1 year. Population Aged 12-
62 in 2002 (15-65 in 2005). "Young" refers to those individuals aged 12-29 
in 2002 (15-32 in 2005); "Old" refers to those aged 30-62 in 2002 (33-65 in 
Table 5.4: Wages in Mexico in 2002 - Distribution Among Migrant and Non-Migrant
Mexicans
119Graph 4: Wages in Mexico in 2002  - Distribution Functions of Migrant and Non-Migrant Mexicans
Note: Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS), 2002. Migrant US identifies those Mexican migrants in the 
United States in 2005 that migrated after 2002 and have stayed over 1 year. Population Aged 12-62 in 
2002 (15-65 in 2005). "Young" refers to those individuals aged 12-29 in 2002 (15-32 in 2005); "Old" 
refers to those aged 30-62 in 2002 (33-65 in 2005). Log wages correspond to the log hourly wage 
earned in Mexico in 2002 in dollars.
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Figure 5.3: Wages in Mexico in 2002 - Distribution Functions of Migrant and Non-
Migrant Mexicans
120Graph 5: Wages in Mexico in 2002  - Differences in Distribution Functions between Migrant and Non-Migrant Mexicans
Note: Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS), 2002. Migrant US identifies those Mexican migrants in the 
United States in 2005 that migrated after 2002 and have stayed over 1 year. Population Aged 12-62 in 2002 
(15-65 in 2005). "Young" refers to those individuals aged 12-29 in 2002 (15-32 in 2005); "Old" refers to those 
aged 30-62 in 2002 (33-65 in 2005). Log wages correspond to the log hourly wage earned in Mexico in 2002 
in dollars.
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Figure 5.4: Wages in Mexico in 2002 - Differences in Distribution Functions between
Migrant and Non-Migrant Mexicans
121Table 4: Raven's Test Score  - Distribution Among Migrant and Non-Migrant Mexicans
Mean p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
All
Non-Migrant 51.2 25.0 33.3 50.0 66.7 75.0
Migrant 48.7 16.7 33.3 50.0 66.7 75.0
Young (12-29) Non-Migrant 55.8 25.0 41.7 58.3 75.0 83.3
Young (12-29) Migrant 50.6 16.7 33.3 50.0 66.7 75.0
Old (30-62) Non-Migrant 48.0 16.7 33.3 50.0 66.7 75.0
Old (30-62) Migrant 43.7 16.7 25.0 41.7 66.7 75.0
Male
Non-Migrant 53.0 25.0 33.3 58.3 66.7 83.3
Migrant 49.9 16.7 33.3 50.0 66.7 75.0
Young (12-29) Non-Migrant 56.7 25.0 41.7 58.3 75.0 83.3
Young (12-29) Migrant 51.5 16.7 33.3 58.3 66.7 75.0
Old (30-62) Non-Migrant 50.4 16.7 33.3 50.0 66.7 75.0
Old (30-62) Migrant 44.0 16.7 25.0 41.7 66.7 75.0
Female
Non-Migrant 49.8 16.7 33.3 50.0 66.7 75.0
Migrant 47.0 16.7 33.3 50.0 66.7 75.0
Young (12-29) Non-Migrant 55.1 25.0 41.7 58.3 75.0 83.3
Young (12-29) Migrant 48.9 16.7 33.3 50.0 66.7 75.0
Old (30-62) Non-Migrant 46.3 16.7 33.3 50.0 66.7 75.0
Old (30-62) Migrant 43.3 16.7 25.0 33.3 66.7 75.0
Note: Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS), 2002. Weighted Statistics. 
Migrant US identifies those Mexican migrants in the United States in 
2005 that migrated after 2002 and have stayed over 1 year. Population 
Aged 12-62 in 2002 (15-65 in 2005). "Young" refers to those individuals 
aged 12-29 in 2002 (15-32 in 2005); "Old" refers to those aged 30-62 in 
Table 5.5: Raven’s Test Score - Distribution Among Migrant and Non-Migrant Mexi-
cans
122Annex Table 1: Male Descriptives
Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev.
Migration US 3.3% 17.9%
Age 30.7 14.2 30.9 14.3 24.1 9.4 18.9 5.0 20.2 4.0 43.4 9.2 40.1 7.9
Years Education 9.1 3.6 9.1 3.6 8.5 2.8 10.1 3.0 8.9 2.6 8.6 3.8 7.1 3.1
Primary 35% 48% 35% 48% 40% 49% 17% 38% 33% 47% 45% 50% 60% 49%
Secondary 50% 50% 50% 50% 58% 49% 70% 46% 65% 48% 39% 49% 38% 48%
Tertiary 15% 35% 15% 36% 2% 14% 13% 34% 2% 14% 16% 37% 2% 15%
Spanish Speaker 98.7% 11.5% 98.7% 11.5% 98.4% 12.4% 99.3% 8.6% 98.2% 13.4% 98.3% 12.8% 99.2% 8.8%
Indigenous 12.7% 33.3% 12.2% 32.8% 25.8% 43.8% 9.8% 29.7% 26.8% 44.3% 13.6% 34.3% 22.9% 42.0%
Rural 40.9% 49.2% 39.9% 49.0% 69.9% 45.9% 42.2% 49.4% 70.1% 45.8% 37.4% 48.4% 68.9% 46.3%
Employed 63.9% 48.0% 64.1% 48.0% 58.6% 49.3% 33.6% 47.2% 48.9% 50.0% 95.5% 20.8% 98.6% 11.8%
Receives Income 59.1% 49.2% 59.4% 49.1% 51.8% 50.0% 28.6% 45.2% 42.4% 49.4% 94.5% 22.8% 98.1% 13.6%
Amount Income 2034 2792 2068 2814 1038 1772 719 1586 658 1248 3607 3105 2900 2591
Previous Migration 7.5% 26.3% 7.5% 26.3% 6.9% 25.3% 3.2% 17.6% 4.0% 19.6% 9.9% 29.8% 15.6% 36.3%
 -"- outside Mexico 1.6% 12.6% 1.6% 12.4% 3.3% 17.8% 0.8% 9.0% 2.4% 15.2% 2.1% 14.5% 6.6% 24.9%
Potential Migration 22.4% 41.7% 22.1% 41.5% 30.3% 45.9% 27.2% 44.5% 35.0% 47.7% 19.2% 39.4% 15.7% 36.4%
 -"- outside Mexico 4.2% 20.0% 3.9% 19.3% 12.6% 33.2% 5.7% 23.1% 15.1% 35.8% 2.9% 16.8% 4.9% 21.6%
Relatives in USA 32.8% 46.9% 31.9% 46.6% 55.5% 49.7% 33.3% 47.1% 55.5% 49.7% 31.1% 46.3% 55.6% 49.7%
Anyone in Household(HH)  -"-  48.6% 50.0% 47.7% 49.9% 74.1% 43.8% 47.8% 50.0% 74.1% 43.8% 47.5% 49.9% 74.2% 43.7%
HH Home Ownership Indicator 81.2% 39.1% 81.1% 39.1% 83.3% 37.3% 81.0% 39.2% 83.6% 37.0% 81.2% 39.0% 81.7% 38.7%
HH Financial Assets Indicator 17.0% 37.6% 17.2% 37.7% 12.5% 33.0% 15.5% 36.2% 13.3% 33.9% 19.0% 39.2% 9.3% 29.0%
HH Savings Indicator 17.2% 37.8% 17.4% 38.0% 10.9% 31.1% 16.1% 36.7% 10.9% 31.2% 18.9% 39.1% 10.7% 30.9%
HH Debts Indicator 37.9% 48.5% 37.9% 48.5% 38.0% 48.6% 39.2% 48.8% 36.9% 48.3% 36.5% 48.2% 42.8% 49.5%
Number Observations 12,315 11,852 463 5,978 339 5,874 124
Observations in Mexican 
Population
Note: Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS), 2002. Weighted Statistics. Migrant US identifies those Mexican migrants in the United States in 2005 
that migrated after 2002 and have stayed over 1 year.Population Aged 12-62 in 2002 (15-65 in 2005). "Young" refers to those individuals aged 
All US Migrant US
Non Migrant  Migrant US Non Migrant  Migrant US
Young (12-29) Old (30-62)
826,177 14,600,000 200,233 30,900,000 29,900,000 1,026,410 15,300,000
Table 5.6: Male Descriptives
123Annex Table 2: Female Descriptives
Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev.
Migration US 1.6% 12.6%
Age 31.6 13.8 31.7 13.9 26.0 9.6 19.4 5.1 20.7 4.0 43.0 8.9 38.2 7.2
Years Education 8.2 3.7 8.2 3.7 8.6 3.2 9.7 3.2 9.1 3.0 7.4 3.7 7.7 3.5
Primary 45% 50% 45% 50% 37% 48% 24% 43% 30% 46% 56% 50% 49% 50%
Secondary 46% 50% 46% 50% 56% 50% 64% 48% 64% 48% 36% 48% 42% 49%
Tertiary 9% 29% 9% 29% 7% 26% 12% 32% 6% 24% 8% 27% 9% 29%
Spanish Speaker 97.8% 14.6% 97.8% 14.6% 96.4% 18.6% 98.3% 12.8% 94.2% 23.3% 97.6% 15.4% 100.0% 0.0%
Indigenous 12.5% 33.0% 12.4% 33.0% 16.5% 37.1% 12.1% 32.7% 20.3% 40.2% 12.5% 33.1% 10.3% 30.4%
Rural 41.3% 49.2% 40.9% 49.2% 65.7% 47.5% 43.6% 49.6% 68.5% 46.5% 38.4% 48.6% 59.3% 49.1%
Employed 30.8% 46.2% 30.8% 46.2% 30.6% 46.1% 18.6% 38.9% 25.3% 43.5% 41.9% 49.3% 42.5% 49.4%
Receives Income 26.8% 44.3% 26.8% 44.3% 25.1% 43.4% 15.9% 36.6% 21.9% 41.4% 37.2% 48.3% 33.1% 47.1%
Amount Income 726 1814 729 1820 549 1390 325 1010 386 1053 1113 2277 956 1940
Previous Migration 4.5% 20.8% 4.5% 20.8% 5.1% 22.1% 1.0% 9.9% 3.0% 17.2% 6.4% 24.5% 8.7% 28.1%
 -"- outside Mexico 0.3% 5.3% 0.3% 5.2% 0.7% 8.3% 0.1% 3.5% 0.4% 6.0% 0.4% 6.2% 1.4% 11.7%
Potential Migration 19.0% 39.2% 18.8% 39.1% 33.1% 47.0% 27.2% 44.5% 34.7% 47.6% 14.2% 35.0% 30.4% 46.0%
 -"- outside Mexico 2.7% 16.1% 2.5% 15.5% 15.9% 36.6% 3.8% 19.0% 12.7% 33.3% 1.7% 13.1% 21.2% 40.8%
Relatives in USA 34.5% 47.5% 33.8% 47.3% 79.1% 40.6% 33.3% 47.1% 75.6% 42.9% 34.0% 47.4% 85.1% 35.6%
Anyone in Household(HH)  -"-  48.8% 50.0% 48.1% 50.0% 89.3% 31.0% 49.1% 50.0% 87.4% 33.2% 47.3% 49.9% 93.5% 24.7%
HH Home Ownership Indicator 80.3% 39.8% 80.3% 39.8% 81.5% 38.8% 79.2% 40.6% 81.6% 38.7% 81.3% 39.0% 81.2% 39.1%
HH Financial Assets Indicator 17.4% 37.9% 17.4% 37.9% 12.1% 32.6% 17.1% 37.6% 10.3% 30.4% 17.8% 38.2% 16.2% 36.9%
HH Savings Indicator 16.7% 37.3% 16.8% 37.4% 12.6% 33.2% 16.5% 37.1% 8.5% 28.0% 17.0% 37.6% 21.9% 41.4%
HH Debts Indicator 36.4% 48.1% 36.5% 48.1% 35.9% 48.0% 37.4% 48.4% 32.9% 47.0% 35.6% 47.9% 42.6% 49.4%
Number Observations 13,505 13,224 281 6,468 198 6,756 83
Observations in Mexican 
Population
All
Note: Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS), 2002. Weighted Statistics. Migrant US identifies those Mexican migrants in the United States in 2005 
that migrated after 2002 and have stayed over 1 year.Population Aged 12-62 in 2002 (15-65 in 2005). "Young" refers to those individuals aged 
Non Migrant  Migrant US Non Migrant  Migrant US
US Migrant US Young (12-29) Old (30-62)
438,232 19,900,000 192,805 39,000,000 38,300,000 631,037 18,400,000
Table 5.7: Female Descriptives
124All Male Female
Dependent Variable:
Raven's Test Score
Age -0.378** -0.341** -0.406**
(0.017) (0.025) (0.024)
Migrant -5.635** -6.232** -5.805**
(1.236) (1.606) (1.923)
Constant 64.182** 64.678** 63.802**
(0.623) (0.900) (0.861)
Number of Observations 18461 8205 10256
R-Square 0.051 0.044 0.056
Note: Dependent Variable: Raven's Test Score (from 0 to 100). Data:
Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS), 2002. Weighted Regression.
Migrant US identifies those Mexican migrants in the United States in 2005 
that migrated after 2002 and have stayed over 1 year. Population Aged
12-62 in 2002 (15-65 in 2005). * p<0.05, ** p<0.01. 
Appendix Table 3: Raven's Test Score  - OLS Regression 
Table 5.8: Raven’s Test Score - OLS Regression
125Mean p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
Years of Education
Male
Young (12-36) Non-Migrant 9.9 6 9 9 12 14
Young (12-36) Migrant 8.8 6 6 9 11 12
Old (37-62) Non-Migrant 8.2 6 6 6 12 14
Old (37-62) Migrant 6.8 0 6 6 9 12
Female
Young (12-36) Non-Migrant 9.3 6 6 9 12 14
Young (12-36) Migrant 9.0 6 6 9 12 13
Old (37-62) Non-Migrant 6.9 0 6 6 9 12
Old (37-62) Migrant 6.6 0 6 6 9 9
Log Wage
Male
Young (12-36) Non-Migrant 1.9 0.5 0.8 1.3 2.1 3.3
Young (12-36) Migrant 1.9 0.5 0.7 1.0 1.5 3.1
Old (37-62) Non-Migrant 2.6 0.6 1.0 1.7 2.9 5.7
Old (37-62) Migrant 1.5 0.3 0.5 1.0 2.0 3.0
Female
Young (12-36) Non-Migrant 1.8 0.5 0.8 1.1 2.0 4.0
Young (12-36) Migrant 1.8 0.3 0.7 1.4 2.6 3.4
Old (37-62) Non-Migrant 2.7 0.7 1.0 1.8 3.4 6.2
Old (37-62) Migrant 1.9 0.5 0.5 1.5 1.7 6.3
Skills
Male
Young (12-36) Non-Migrant 56.1 25.0 41.7 58.3 75.0 83.3
Young (12-36) Migrant 50.8 16.7 33.3 50.0 66.7 75.0
Old (37-62) Non-Migrant 48.5 16.7 33.3 50.0 66.7 75.0
Old (37-62) Migrant 43.8 16.7 25.0 41.7 66.7 75.0
Female
Young (12-36) Non-Migrant 53.5 25.0 41.7 58.3 66.7 75.0
Young (12-36) Migrant 48.1 25.0 33.3 50.0 66.7 75.0
Old (37-62) Non-Migrant 44.5 16.7 25.0 41.7 58.3 75.0
Old (37-62) Migrant 40.7 16.7 25.0 33.3 58.3 66.7
Note: Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS), 2002. Weighted Statistics. Migrant US 
identifies those Mexican migrants in the United States in 2005 that migrated after 
2002 and have stayed over 1 year. Population Aged 12-62 in 2002 (15-65 in 2005). 
"Young" refers to those individuals aged 12-36 in 2002 (15-39 in 2005); "Old" refers 
to those aged 37-62 in 2002 (40-65 in 2005). Wages correspond to the hourly wage 
Appendix Table 4: Alternative Young Definition (12-36) - Number of Years of 
Education, Log Wages and Raven´s Test Scores Distributions Among Migrant 
and Non-Migrant Mexicans
Table 5.9: Alternative Young Deﬁnition (12-36) - Number of Years of Education, Log
Wages and Ravens Test Scores Distributions Among Migrant and Non-Migrant Mexi-
cans
126Mean p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
Years of Education
Male
Young (20-29) Non-Migrant 10.4 6 9 10 12 14
Young (20-29) Migrant 9.0 6 6 9 11 12
Old (30-62) Non-Migrant 8.6 6 6 9 12 14
Old (30-62) Migrant 7.1 6 6 6 9 12
Female
Young (20-29) Non-Migrant 9.9 6 8 9 12 14
Young (20-29) Migrant 9.1 6 6 9 12 13
Old (30-62) Non-Migrant 7.4 0 6 6 9 12
Old (30-62) Migrant 7.7 6 6 9 9 12
Log Wage
Male
Young (20-29) Non-Migrant 1.8 0.5 0.8 1.2 1.8 3.1
Young (20-29) Migrant 1.8 0.5 0.7 1.0 1.4 2.9
Old (30-62) Non-Migrant 2.4 0.6 1.0 1.7 2.8 5.2
Old (30-62) Migrant 2.1 0.5 0.6 1.1 3.0 5.9
Female
Young (20-29) Non-Migrant 1.5 0.5 0.7 1.1 1.7 3.1
Young (20-29) Migrant 1.6 0.7 0.8 1.4 1.8 3.2
Old (30-62) Non-Migrant 2.6 0.6 1.0 1.5 3.1 5.7
Old (30-62) Migrant 2.1 0.1 0.5 1.5 3.3 5.2
Skills
Male
Young (20-29) Non-Migrant 57.6 25.0 41.7 58.3 75.0 83.3
Young (20-29) Migrant 53.9 25.0 41.7 58.3 75.0 75.0
Old (30-62) Non-Migrant 50.4 16.7 33.3 50.0 66.7 75.0
Old (30-62) Migrant 44.0 16.7 25.0 41.7 66.7 75.0
Female
Young (20-29) Non-Migrant 55.0 25.0 41.7 58.3 75.0 83.3
Young (20-29) Migrant 49.0 16.7 33.3 50.0 66.7 75.0
Old (30-62) Non-Migrant 46.3 16.7 33.3 50.0 66.7 75.0
Old (30-62) Migrant 43.3 16.7 25.0 33.3 66.7 75.0
Appendix Table 5: Alternative Young Definition (20-29) - Number of 
Years of Education, Log Wages and Raven´s Test Scores 
Distributions Among Migrant and Non-Migrant Mexicans
Note: Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS), 2002. Weighted Statistics. Migrant US 
identifies those Mexican migrants in the United States in 2005 that migrated after 
2002 and have stayed over 1 year. Population Aged 20-62 in 2002 (23-65 in 
2005). "Young" refers to those individuals aged 20-29 in 2002 (23-32 in 2005); 
"Old" refers to those aged 30-62 in 2002 (33-65 in 2005). Wages correspond to 
the hourly wage earned in Mexico in 2002 in dollars.
Table 5.10: Alternative Young Deﬁnition (20-29) - Number of Years of Education,
Log Wages and Ravens Test Scores Distributions Among Migrant and Non-Migrant
Mexicans
127Chapter 6
Concluding Remarks
Migration is not a unidirectional movement: there is increasing evidence that many
migrants leaving their home countries return after some years (OECD (2008)). This
thesis dissertation has studied the temporariness of migration and the role it plays in
several dimensions.
Migrants do not know if and when they will return just after emigrating, they
update their intentions to return to their home country throughout their stay in the host
country. Chapter 2 has analyzed the formation of migrants’ intentions to stay in the
host country using a dynamic model and how they are modiﬁed during the migration
history. This modelisation allowed to perform several policy simulations and show
their impact modifying migrant return intentions.
Migrant return intentions are however not important only per se. The following
chapters have shown the importance of considering migrants’ return plans to study
migrant behaviour. Return plans are associated with different migrant actions while
in the host country. Chapter 3 has shown how changes in return plans modify greatly
remittance behaviour. Those migrants that plan to return are more likely to remit, and
remit a higher amount, in particular to support their families. These results imply that
migration policies that encourage temporary ﬂows will lead to higher remittance ﬂows
than those that encourage a more permament stay.
Not only remittances are related to return plans, but many other migrant be-
haviours while abroad. Chapter 4 has shown how savings and asset accumulation, both129
in the home and in the host country, are related to return plans. Migrants that plan
to return place a higher proportion of savings and assets in the home country. The
particular distribution of assets, in particular property holdings, between home and
host countries might have important implications for asset and housing markets of both
economies. Several countries are trying to attract investments from their diasporas
abroad issuing speciﬁc diaspora bonds. The results obtained in this thesis suggest that
the success of these policies is not only dependent on the returns of the investments or
the economic prospects of the home country economies, but also on the temporariness
of these diaspora migration movements.
Migrants intentions to stay in the host country are modiﬁed during the life cycle.
At different ages, migrants expect to stay in the host country different lengths of time.
In addition, migrants might have different expected migration durations depending on
their skill level. Chapter 5 has analyzed a related aspect: migrants’ skill selection and
the age gradient of migration. The impact of migration on both home and host societies
depends in a great extent to the migrants’ skill selection. The chapter has discussed
the importance of studying migrant selection for comparable age groups. The results
have shown a negative skill selection when properly comparing migrants to those non-
migrants of the same age cohort. Young Mexican migrants to the United States seem
negatively selected in terms of education, wages and cognitive skills.Bibliography
Acosta, P., Calderon, C. A., Fajnzylber, P. R. & Lopez, H. (2006), ‘Remittances and
Development in Latin America’, The World Economy 29(7), 957–987.
Adams, R. H. J. (2006a), ‘International Remittances and the Household: Analysis and
Review of Global Evidence’, J Afr Econ 15(2), 396–425.
Adams, R. H. J. (2006b), Remittances, Poverty and Investment in Guatemala, pp. 53–
80.
Adda, J. & Cooper, R. (2000), ‘Balladurette and juppette: A discrete analysis of scrap-
ping subsidies’, Journal of Political Economy 108(4), 778–806.
Agarwal, R. & Horowitz, A. W. (2002), ‘Are International Remittances Altruism or
Insurance? Evidence from Guyana Using Multiple-Migrant Households’, World De-
velopment 30(11), 2033–2044.
Amuedo-Dorantes, C.&Pozo, S.(2002), ‘PrecautionarySavingsbyYoungImmigrants
and Young Natives’, Southern Economic Journal 69(1), 48–71.
Amuedo-Dorantes, C. & Pozo, S. (2006), ‘Remittances as insurance: evidence from
Mexican immigrants’, Journal of Population Economics 19(2), 227–254.
Arbeitslosigkeit im Zeitverlauf (2009), Technical report, Bundesagentur fuer Arbeit.
Arellano, M. (2003), Panel Data Econometrics, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Arellano, M. & Bond, S. (1991), ‘Some Tests of Speciﬁcation for Panel Data: Monte
Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations’, The Review of Eco-
nomic Studies 58(2), 277–297.BIBLIOGRAPHY 131
Arellano, M. & Bover, O. (1995), ‘Another look at the instrumental variable estimation
of error-components models’, Journal of Econometrics 68(1), 29–51.
Aydemir, A. & Borjas, G. J. (2007), ‘Cross-country variation in the impact of interna-
tional migration: Canada, mexico, and the united states’, Journal of the European
Economic Association 5(4), 663–708.
Azam, J.-P. & Gubert, F. (2006), ‘Migrants’ Remittances and the Household in Africa:
A Review of Evidence’, J Afr Econ 15(2), 426–462.
Barth, E., Bratsberg, B. & Raaum, O. (2004), ‘Identifying earnings assimilation of
immigrants under changing macroeconomic conditions’, Scandinavian Journal of
Economics 106(1), 1–22.
Bauer, T. K., Cobb-Clark, D. A., Hildebrand, V. A. & Sinning, M. (2011), ‘A compar-
ative analysis of the nativity wealth gap’, Economic Inquiry .
Bauer, T. & Sinning, M. (2011), ‘The savings behavior of temporary and permanent
migrants in germany’, Journal of Population Economics 24(2), 421–449.
Blau, F. & Graham, J. W. (1990), ‘Black-white differences in wealth and asset compo-
sition’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 105(2), 321–39.
Blitz, R. (1977), ‘A beneﬁt-cost analysis of foreign workers in west-germany, 1957-
1973’, 30(3), 479 – 502.
Bohning, W. (1987), Studies in International Migration, St. Martin’s Press, New York.
Borjas, G. (1987), ‘Self-selection and the earnings of immigrants’, American Economic
Review 4(77), 531–553.
Borjas, G. J. (1985), ‘Assimilation, changes in cohort quality, and the earnings of im-
migrants’, Journal of Labour Economics (3), 463–489.
Borjas, G. J. (1995), ‘Assimilation and changes in cohort quality revisited - what hap-
pened to immigrant earnings in the 1980s’, Journal of Labor Economics 13(2), 201–
245.BIBLIOGRAPHY 132
Borjas, G. J. (2002), ‘Homeownership in the immigrant population’, Journal of Urban
Economics 52(3), 448–476.
Bratsberg, B., Barth, E. & Raaum, O. (2006), ‘Local unemployment and the relative
wages of immigrants: Evidence from the current population surveys’, The Review of
Economics and Statistics 88(2), 243–263.
Bundesbank (2008), Financial accounts for germany 1991 to 2007, Technical report.
Card, D. & Lemieux, T. (2001), ‘Can falling supply explain the rising return to college
for younger men? a cohort-based analysis’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics
pp. 705–746.
Chiquiar, D. & Hanson, G. (2005), ‘International migration, self-selection, and the dis-
tribution of wages: Evidence from mexico and the united states’, Journal of Political
Economy 113(2), 239–281.
Chiswick, B. R. (1978), ‘The Effect of Americanization on the Earnings of Foreign-
born Men’, The Journal of Political Economy 86(5), 897–921.
Chiswick, B. R. (1999), ‘Are immigrants favorably self-selected?’, The American Eco-
nomic Review 89(2), 181–185.
Cobb-Clark, D. & Hildebrand (2006), ‘he wealth and asset holdings of u.s.-born and
foreign-born households: Evidence from sipp data’, Review of Income and Wealth
52(1), 17–42.
Coulson, N. E. (1999), ‘hy are hispanic and asian-american homeownership rates so
low? immigration and other factors’, Journal of Urban Economics 45(2), 209–227.
Cox, D. (1987), ‘Motives for Private Income Transfers’, Journal of Political Economy
95(3), 508–46.
Cox, D., Eser, Z. & Jimenez, E. (1998), ‘Motives for private transfers over the life
cycle: An analytical framework and evidence for Peru’, Journal of Development
Economics 55(1), 57–80.BIBLIOGRAPHY 133
de la Briere, B., Sadoulet, E., de Janvry, A. & Lambert, S. (2002), ‘The roles of des-
tination, gender, and household composition in explaining remittances: an analysis
for the Dominican Sierra’, Journal of Development Economics 68(2), 309–328.
Djajic, S. (1989), ‘Migrants in a guest-worker system : A utility maximizing approach’,
Journal of Development Economics 31, 327–339.
Djajic, S. & Milbourne, R. (1988), ‘A general equilibrium model of guest-worker
migration: A source-country perspective’, Journal of International Economics
(25), 335–351.
Docquier, F. & Rapoport, H. (2006), The Economics of Migrants’ Remittances, Vol. 1,
Elsevier.
Durand, J., Kandel, W., Parrado, E.A.&Massey, D.S.(1996), ‘InternationalMigration
and Development in Mexican Communities’, Demography 33(2), 249–264.
Dustmann, C. (1993), ‘Earnings Adjustment of Temporary Migrants’, Journal of Pop-
ulation Economics 6, 153–168.
Dustmann, C. (1995), ‘Savings Behavior of Migrant Workers - A Life Cycle Analysis’,
Zeitschrift fuer Wirtschafts- und Socialwissenschaften 4, 511 – 533.
Dustmann, C. (1996), ‘Return Migration: The European Experience’, Economic Policy
22, 215–250.
Dustmann, C. (1997), ‘Return migration, uncertainty and precautionary savings’, Jour-
nal of Development Economics 52(2), 295–316.
Dustmann, C. (1999), ‘Temporary migration, human capital, and language ﬂuency of
migrants’, Scandinavian Journal of Economics 101(2), 297–314.
Dustmann, C. (2000), Temporary migration and economic assimilation, IZA Discus-
sion Papers 186, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
Dustmann, C. & Kirchkamp, O. (2002), ‘The optimal migration duration and activity
choice after re-migration’, Journal of Development Economics 67(2), 351372.BIBLIOGRAPHY 134
Dustmann, C. & Mestres, J. (2010a), ‘Remittances and temporary migration’, Journal
of Development Economics 92, 62–70.
Dustmann, C. & Mestres, J. (2010b), ‘Savings, asset holdings, and temporary migra-
tion’, Annales d’Economie et de Statistique (97/98).
Dustmann, C. & Weiss, Y. (2007), ‘Return migration: Theory and empirical evidence
from the uk’, British Journal of Industrial Relations 45, 236–256.
Faini, R. (2006), ‘Remittances and the Brain Drain’, IZA Discussion Paper (2155).
Fernandez-Huertas, J. (2009), ‘New evidence on emigrant selection’, The Review of
Economics and Statistics (forthcoming).
Friedberg, R. (1993), ‘The labor market assimilation of immigrants in the united states:
The role of age at arrival’, Brown University manuscript .
Funkhouser, E. (1995), ‘Remittances from international migration: A comparison of el
salvador and nicaragua’, The Review of Economics and Statistics 77(1), 137–46.
Galor, O. & Stark, O. (1990), ‘Migrants’ savings, the probability of return migration
and migrants’ performance’, International Economic Review 31(2), 463–67.
Galor, O. & Stark, O. (1991), ‘The probability of return migration, migrants’ work
effort, and migrants’ performance’, Journal of Development Economics 35(2), 399–
405.
Glytsos, N. (1988), ‘Remittances and temporary migration: A theoretical model and its
testing with the greek-german experience’, Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv (124), 524–
549.
Hanson, G. (2007), ‘Emigration, remittances and labor force participation in mexico’,
Integration and Trade Journal 27, 73–103.
Heckman, J.&Singer, B.(1984), ‘Amethodforminimizingtheimpactofdistributional
assumptions in econometric models for duration data’, Econometrica 52(2), 271–
320.BIBLIOGRAPHY 135
Hoddinott, J. (1994), ‘A Model of Migration and Remittances Applied to Western
Kenya’, Oxford Economic Papers 46(3), 459–76.
Hsiao, C. (1986), Analysis of Panel Data, Cambridge University Press.
Ibarraran, P. & Lubotsky, D. (2005), ‘Mexican inmigration and self-selection:new evi-
dence from the 2000 mexican census’, National Bureau of Economic Research Work-
ing Papers (11456).
Jasso, G. & Rosenzweig, M. (1982), ‘Estimating the emigration rates of legal immi-
grants using administrative and survey data: The 1971 cohort of immigrants to the
united states’, Demography 19(3), 279–290.
Laferrere, A. & Wolff, F.-C. (2000), Microeconomic Models of Family Transfers, in
L. Gerard-Varet, S. Kolm & J. Mercier-Ytier, eds, ‘Handbook on the Economics on
Giving, Reciprocity and Altruism’, MacMillan and St Martin Press, chapter 12.
Lubotsky, D. (2007), ‘Chutes or ladders? a longitudinal analysis of immigrant earn-
ings’, Journal of Political Economy 115(5), 820–867.
Lucas, R. E. B. & Stark, O. (1985), ‘Motivations to Remit: Evidence from Botswana’,
Journal of Political Economy 93(5), 901–18.
Lucas, R. E. B. & Stark, O. (1988), ‘Migration, Remittances, and the Family’, Eco-
nomic Development and Cultural Change 36(3), 465–81.
McKenzie, D. & Rapoport, H. (2007), ‘Network effects and the dynamics of migra-
tion and inequality: Theory and evidence from mexico’, Journal of Development
Economics 84, 1–24.
McKenzie, D.&Rapoport, H.(2010), ‘Self-selectionpatternsinmexico-u.s.migration.
the role of migration networks’, The Review of Economics and Statistics .
Mesnard, A. (2004), ‘Temporary migration and capital market imper-
fections’, Oxford Economic Papers 56(2), 242–262. available at
http://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/oxecpp/v56y2004i2p242-262.html.BIBLIOGRAPHY 136
Minnesota Population Center. Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS)
(2010).
Mishra, P. (2007), ‘Emigration and wages in source countries: Evidence from mexico’,
Journal of Development Economics 82, 180–199.
OECD (2005), Migration, Remittances and Development, OECD Publishing.
OECD (2006), International Migration Outlook, OECD Publishing.
OECD (2008), International Migration Outlook, OECD Publishing.
Okonkwo Osili, U. (2007), ‘Remittances and Savings from International Migration:
Theory and Evidence Using a Matched Sample’, Journal of Development Economics
83(2), 446–465.
Orrenius, P. M. & Zavodny, M. (2005), ‘Self-selection among undocumented immi-
grants from mexico’, Journal of Development Economics 78(1), 215–240.
Osili, U. O. & Paulson, A. (2004), ‘Prospects for immigrant-native wealth assimilation:
Evidence from ﬁnancial market participation’, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Working Paper 04(18).
Painter, G., Yang, L. & Yu, Z. (2003), ‘eterogeneity in asian american homeownership:
the impact of household endowments and immigrant status’, Urban Studies 40, 505–
530.
Paul Gertler, H. P. & Codina, M. R. (2007), ‘Do supply-side-oriented and demand-side-
oriented educational interventions generate synergies?’, mimeo .
Poirine, B. (1997), ‘A theory of remittances as an implicit family loan arrangement’,
World Development 25(4), 589–611.
Ratha, D. (2003), Workers Remittances: An Important and Stable Source of External
Development Finance, Global development ﬁnance, The World Bank.
Ratha, D., Mohapatra, S., Vijayalakshmi, K. & Xu, Z. (2007), ‘Remittance Trends
2007’, Migration and Development Brief (3).BIBLIOGRAPHY 137
Roodman, D. (2006), ‘An Introduction to Difference and System GMM in Stata’, Cen-
ter for Global Development Working Paper Series .
Rubalcava, L. & Teruel, G. (2006), ‘Users guide for the mexican family life survey ﬁrst
wave’.
Rubalcava, L. & Teruel, G. (2008), ‘Users guide for the mexican family life survey
second wave’.
Sinning, M. (2007), ‘Wealth and asset holdings of immigrants in germany’, IZA Dis-
cussion Paper 3089.
Sinning, M. (2009), ‘Home-ownership and economic performance of immigrants in
germany’, Urban Studies 47, 387–409.
Sjaastad, L. A. (1962), ‘The costs and returns of human migration’, The Journal of
Political Economy 70(5), 80–93.
Stark, O. & Taylor, J. E. (1991), ‘Migration incentives, migration types: The role of
relative deprivation’, Economic Journal 101(408), 1163–78.
Tauchen, G. & Hussey, R. (1991), ‘Quadrature-based methods for obtaining approxi-
mate solutions to nonlinear asset pricing models’, Econometrica 59(2), 371–96.
Warren, R. & Peck, J. (1980), ‘Foreign-born emigration from the united states’, De-
mography (17), 71–84.
Woodruff, C. & Zenteno, R. (2007), ‘Migration networks and microenterprises in Mex-
ico’, Journal of Development Economics 82(2), 509–528.
WorldBank (2006), ‘World Development Indicators’.
Yang, D. (2006), International Migration, Remittances, and Household Investment: Ev-
idence from Philippine Migrants’ Exchange Rate Shocks, NBER Working Papers
12325, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.